An excerpt taken from the opinion of the Court. Note that citations and internal quotes have been omitted.
Justice Almikra delivered the Opinion of the Court:
This case arises out of a controversy currently raging across the sea in the kingdom of Indon. There, the people are facing great upheaval as they try to desperately overcome the tyranny that has gripped them. As the world watches, a great prejudice has grown up towards the dwarven race. One manifestation of this prejudice is the direct issue in this case. It is that the University of Thoth, a well-respected institute of higher learning in Draconia, has decreed that none of the dwarven race may be admitted to the school so long as Indon remains in turmoil. The appellant in this case is a dwarf that was denied admission under this policy at the Tallian Campus of the University of Thoth. The appellee is the Board of Deans, the governing body of the said campus. The sole point of error raised by the appellant is that the lower courts erred in deciding that the policy of the University was rationally related to a compelling interest. For the reasons that follow, we agree and now reverse the decision of the lower courts.
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Appellee raises as first defense that the Equal Protection Clause of the 13th Amendment does not apply to them because they are not state actors. However, this is a mischaracterization of their status. The University of Thoth is registered in the Supreme Republic as a public institution, which they have done to open the doors to receiving funding from the federal government. The University may not avail itself of the benefits of public status while attempting to shield itself from the duties that the status confers. ***Therefore, the first defense raised by the University is invalid.
Appellee tried to file a cross-claim against the Board of Provosts of the University of Thoth, which is the superior governing body of the University worldwide. Appellee argued that the action was undertaken pursuant to a policy originating with the Board of Provosts, thereby indemnifying the Board of Deans of the Tallian Campus from liability. The trial court found that the cross-claim was properly brought and admitted the Board of Provosts as a party to the litigation. We do not need to decide this matter because the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit already reversed that decision on an interlocutory appeal raised by the Board of Provosts. We do note that the reasoning of the Second Circuit is compelling, that the Board of Provosts has not purposefully availed itself of the laws of the Supreme Republic. It cannot be hailed into court here.
Appellee cross-appealed to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals made this decision in error and that such a decision would seemingly leave the Board of Provosts immune to suit across the world, since they are not "found" within any nation. Appellant argues that since this was decided on an interlocutory appeal, the time for raising this issue to this Court has passed. We have never held this to be the rule. In fact, our own rules of procedure allow issues to be raised on appeal so long as they appear somewhere within the current case or controversy. This saves the Court's time and energy and that of the parties' by allowing all appeals to be brought to and resolved by the highest court at the same time.
Appellant argues that this rule defeats the purpose of an interlocutory appeal, which is designed to cover those issues that would prevent a trial court from proceeding further into the case. Moreover, as appellant argues, this rule relies on the assumption that one of the parties will appeal the decision of the trial court at the end of all that court's hearings and trials on the matter. We agree with appellants that our current rule allowing for a single appeal of all matters, including interlocutory appeals brought at various points in the litigation, makes little sense. We have promulgated many procedural rules in the name of efficiency and expediency and while many of them are helpful, we now believe that this can be taken too far. Such is the case here.
We further note that the original rule was designed to reduce the number of times cases come up to this Court, which causes delays because the District Court cannot proceed further until it has either received affirmation or further instructions from the Appellate Court. Moreover, allowing all the interlocutory appeals to be brought with all other appeals did not make sense with the current Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that no issue that is not raised in the Court of Appeals can be brought to the Supreme Court. This means that a claimant would have to argue to the Court of Appeals that the same circuit Court of Appeals erred during the interlocutory appeal. This would mean that, in practicality, most litigants would say, "Court of Appeals, you don't have to reverse yourself. I'm just doing this to go to the Supreme Court with this issue." Such an overly formalistic requirement makes little sense. The Court of Appeals is not an expressway to the Supreme Court.
Therefore, we declare a modification in our rules of procedure that requires interloctutory appeals to be brought within a reasonable time after a decision is rendered by a Court of Appeals. While we do not state what a "reasonable time" is here, we will do so in the official publication of the Supreme Court Rules of Procedure.
Appellee argues that this change of the rule should not invalidate their claim under the ex-post facto clause of the Constitution. However, the ex-post facto clause only applies to acts of Congress. It does not make sense to apply it to the Judiciary. The orders of the Judiciary are inherantly backward-looking. Therefore, our decision here mandates the further conclusion that appellee is time-barred from raising their interlocutory appeal to this Court.
We also note, again without deciding, what the Second Circuit concluded regarding the claim of immunity under the First Amendment's sovereignty clause. The University of Thoth tried to claim that it was immune to suit because the First Amendment stated that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, nor abridging the free exercise thereof, or abridging the sovereignty of Temples." Appellant claims that, since the University is affiliated with the Church of Thoth, subjecting it to the regulations of the state would be abridging its sovereignty. The Second Circuit found this argument unpersuasive stating that the rationale behind the sovereignty clause was to make sure that the various religious organizations could run their Temples located within the Supreme Republic how they saw fit and to give them maximum authority over the land. However, as the Second Circuit further concluded, nothing in the Amendment's history requires that the same apply when a religious organization enters into the realm of business, even where that business is in education.
The dissent would have us decide that the Second Circuit erred in its holding on the sovereignty clause. There are two things that prevent us from making that decision. First, that issue is not properly before this Court. It has not been pleaded on appeal by either party. Certainly, this may be strange, as our reversal of the Second Circuit would benefit the appellee. However, it is not the place for this Court to decide matters that should have been brought by the parties but weren't. The parties must suffer the consequences for not raising issues on appeal.
Second, the dissent would have us extend the application of the sovereignty clause beyond its intended scope. In reading the word "Temples" as it appears in the First Amendment, the dissent believes that it means "religious organizations" in general. This conclusion is contrary to the constitutional text. One need only look to the text of the First Amendment's other religion clauses to show that a distinction was intended. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, nor abriding the free exercise thereof, or abridging the sovereignty of Temples." Had the framers of the First Amendment intended for religious organizations to be included in word "Temples", they would certainly not have drawn the distinction between "religion" and "Temples" in the various clauses of the Amendment. Moreover, President Riffin Wayfalls, who drafted the First Amendment - as well as the other amendments in the Declaration of Rights - said of the sovereignty clause: "The sovereignty of temples is an important right to guarantee for the same reasons that the sovereignty of the Druid Tribes is to be respected. These are groups that have decided to live in separate, isolated communities and have taken upon themselves many of the duties of self-policing." Riffin also made it clear that this sovereignty was not to be taken to the extreme of extending beyond the regulation of the property itself. In this way, Riffin likened it to the sovereignty granted to embassies of foreign nations, though not quite as broad. The origin and treatment of the sovereignty clause compels the conclusion that its use of the word "Temples" is not intended to include religious organizations generally.
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The trial court erred in finding that the policy was rationally related to a legitimate interest. First, the court applied the incorrect standard of review. We have long held that where classifications based on race are employed, the correct standard of review is strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. In this case, there is no compelling government interest. In the first place, the government has not instituted this policy, the Board of Deans of the University has. However, we have already found that they are state actors for purposes of the 13th Amendment. Even given that, they would be most analogous to actors of the Executive Branch, whose policies must generally be pursuant to an Act of Congress. And we can find no such enactment from Congress that expresses this same sentiment. If that were not enough, the rationale behind the policy is not compelling when it is driven completely by animus toward a particular race.
This policy is not even narrowly tailored to achieving what little interest there is. In seeking to respond to the unrest in Indon, the University has instituted a ban on admission for all dwarves. In this way, the burdened class is overinclusive, because it includes dwarves who might not be allied with Indon, such as those living in or loyal to Adhon, which has severed ties to Indon, or those dwarves that support Grimsharda, which has no connection to the conflict... There is no reason to be so broad as to exclude all dwarves from the University. Now, that is not to say that the University can fix the problem by changing the policy to exclude only dwarves from Indon, for we have already said that there is not a compelling government interest at all. Moreover, that would be a classification based on national origin, which is still subject to scrict scrutiny.
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For the foregoing reasons, we find that trial court erred in applying rational basis review to the exclusion policy. We note the other places where the Second Circuit reversed the decisions of the District Court, and do not altar them because they were not raised by the appellants's writ of certiorari, nor by a cross-appeal by appellee. We do find that the appellee's appeal of the Second Circuit's decision regarding the cross-claim against the Board of Provosts was not properly raised. Insofar as the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court regarding the standard of review, we find that their decision must be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistant with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Edwards, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgement.
While I agree with the disposition of the case and with all that the Court has said about the two issues in this case - regarding the correct standard of review and the process for interlocutory appeals - I cannot join the majority's opinion. In my view, the majority's discussion of the other decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals that were not raised before this Court constitute and advisory opinion, which we are forbidden from rendering.
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...By talking so glowingly about the decision of the Court of Appeals on other issues, this Court has essentially given binding effect to those decisions, without proper procedure, including the opportunity for two parties to debate the legality of those decisions before this Court. The majority tells lower courts that they should follow the example of the Second Circuit, instead of establishing our own "supreme" precedent that would truly have binding effect on all courts of this nation. In the absence of the majority's discussion, the Second Circuit's opinion would be binding on just those District Courts that sit within that circuit, and persuasive authority everywhere else. The majority uses this Court's supremacy and national reach to give legal gloss to principles it did not properly decide. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from all those portions of the majority's opinion that are unnecessary for deciding the issues raised to this Court. I otherwise concur.
Justice Mariola, dissenting:
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While I find the actions taken by the University of Thoth repugnant to all standards of fairness, I cannot join the majority's opinion because, in my view, the Second Circuit erred in reversing the trial court's determination regarding the sovereignty clause. The way I see it, the sovereignty clause precludes the courts from intervening in the decisions of a religion. Were the sovereignty clause to mean anything else, it would minimize its impact almost into meaninglessness.
The majority seems to assert that the sovereignty clause only protects the rights of Temples to be free from government intrusion. However, it also guarantees to those that dedicate themselves to the service of the gods that they will be free to follow the tenets of their faith to the fullest. The University of Thoth is simply an exercise of that right by the Church of Thoth. The Church has seen fit, in light of their deity's fundamental doctrines regarding knowledge, to create an institution with facilities all over the world where young minds can come to be filled with whatever knowledge they desire. Several members of this Court have taken advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, the President of the University is the High Priest of Thoth. This shows that the University is merely an appendage to the Church. It's sovereignty is necessary to the furthering of its divine mission. *** For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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