Republic of Kiwa

The Republic of Kiwa is a Sunekan Republic led by an elected Tlakra (semi-royal elective executive) and a Prime Minister (called a Batatlen) who presides over and leads the Assembly as the most prominent member. The central government is quite powerful and is split between a central military bureaucracy and a civilian bureaucracy structured to mirror the military one. The Tlakra holds more influence over the military bureaucracy, while the Assembly and Prime Minister appoint the heads of the civilian bureaucracy.   Kiwa is broken into seventeen provinces, each of which are handled by a Council of Three: a locally-elected Provincial Governor, a military Commandant, and a civilian-track Principle. The Governor, who is often also simultaneously an elected mayor of a local town or city, leads the Council of Three in all local decision making but is also beholden to the two bureaucracies the others represent. These provincial governments have substantial authority in matters of infrastructure, craft production, distribution of goods to communities, and electoral process. Local communities often have their own mayors or leading cliques that handle local issues and communicate with the provincial government.   The Kiwan government categorizes its people into three categories: Water people (Agriculturalists), Grass people (Pastoralists), and Rock people (Mountain communities). These labels are often blanketed across entire communities, though towns are expected to mix these groups and often designate specific dress codes and districts for different categories. Water people, as a category for all sedentary lowlanders, represent the vast majority of the population, though there are significant numbers of Rock people in the Western hills. The Grass People tend to be in flux: increasingly, this represents a mix of traditional semi-nomadic herders, sedentary ranchers, and more mobile craftsmen-soldiers. This formal legal division between Water/Grass/Rock People is not in line with traditional Sunekan beliefs but is tolerated by the greater priesthood as a legal mechanism for managing a diverse and unstable region. Each legal category has their own set of laws, regulations, and expectations. All full Sunekans belonging to a community that reports to a Provincial Governor have a right to vote for their Governor, their Assembly Representative, and the national Tlakra. There is no central voter base; rather, voting power equivalent to their population is assigned to each community, with the most recent census (conducted by the Civilian government every decade) serving as the basis for political power. Each community can determine their own voting rules, which are regulated and enforced by provincial governments (who can veto local voting rules they consider unfair or improper) - a village could vote all as a single bloc based on their majority vote, for example, or they could try and assign votes proportional to the total received votes. The fact that the per-community voting power is predetermined can ironically incentivize the subtle suppression of poor voters, as every absent vote quietly increases the individual voting power of every voting community member. Voting is also a very public process that often favors higher-status community members in both process and social repercussions. Most farmers tied to estates vote in line with estate-managers or simply abstain from voting, for example, to avoid the wrath of their landlords.   Elections are staggered to take place every two years, with Governors and Assembly Representatives facing re-election every 4 years and the Tlakra being elected every 8 years. Currently, there is 1 Representative per 20,000 census-accounted people, with a current total of 285 Assembly Representatives. The Assembly has steadily grown with the overall population since the end of the Great War with Calazen in 1900 and is now considered one of the larger of the Sunekan Assemblies. While the population has since stabilized, a huge boom or loss in population could have institutional ramifications.   Given the large size of the Assembly, the Prime Minister plays a very active role in actually managing the operations of the civilian government. Over the last few decades, Prime Ministers have grown in their power, as they have mobilized Assembly support to grant them power over many of the less-martial roles of the martial bureaucracy. This rise of PM power is tied to the rise of formal partisan power in government; while the Tlakra has to be vetted and confirmed by a politically neutral council of priests, the Prime Minister is directly chosen by political party leadership. Constitutional checks on Tlakra power similarly do not exist for the Prime Minister (as the PM was not an originally envisioned position, but an office that formed over time decades after the constitution was ratified in 1905).  Political parties and factionalism are not unique to the Republic of Kiwa - they exist in most Sunekan republics in some form. Kiwa is unusual, though, in that it has a formalized two-party system with both parties exerting near-total control over candidate nomination, electoral processes, and the Prime Ministership. While not originally planned in the 1905 Constitution, it is virtually impossible to win an election in Kiwa without approval by one of the two parties. Of the 285 assembly members, there are only 9 Independents.    The two parties in Kiwa are the Hix and the Skoli. 

• The Hix could be portrayed as landed semi-isolated conservatives. The Hix run on a platform of agriculture-focused infrastructure, trade protectionism, social-political conservatism, restricted mobility, detachment from foreign alliances, Northward expanionism, and tolerance of local sub-cultures. They tend to pander to landowning cliques and subsidize irrigation of the arid plains for agricultural expansion. They embrace a martial aesthetic and were once a hawkish pro-war party, which lives on in their Northern frontier policies. They treat new technologies and trends with suspicion.
• The Skoli could be characterized as free-market industrial liberals. The Skoli run on a platform of open trade combined with industrial subsidies, freer mobility, less tolerance for local traditions, fewer protections for big estate owners, greater investments in foreign alliances, a less-hostile Northern frontier, and a greater embrace of "modern" Sunekan heartlands culture. They tend to pander to middle-class Kiwans, proto-industrialists, and the mercenary-industrial complex of the Western regions. They embrace a more rational, peaceful, and materialistic aesthetic inherited from their days as a pro-trade anti-war party, even though they aren't really that anymore. 

The Hix currently control the government and have since 2010. Recent instability in Kiwa has dampened Hix popularity, and the party currently holds onto power by delaying elections using emergency powers and dubiously legal legislation. The Hix party is relying a great deal on anti-Skoli sentiment rather than any particular love for the current regime; many Hix supporters associate the Skoli party with the rebels in the West. Some Skoli are rebel-sympathetic, though virtually none of them want the West to secede to join the Republic of Matayan (as some Westerners currently wish to).  Currently, the Tlakra of Kiwa is Kutet Tepoketzin, a seasoned warrior and officer who frames themselves as a responsible moderate and grand unifier. Kutet is very much a Hix politician but ran as a political outsider who would represent soldiers and veterans first. They are a very formal, polite, and almost rigid personality. They are respected within the army for their long history of competent and benevolent military leadership, even among Skoli soldiers, but their reputation for competence and generosity has increasingly soured into one of broken promises and corruption. As an individual, Kutet is still idealistic and kind on an interpersonal level, but as a leader they are stubborn, uncreative, unwilling to admit mistakes, and often unable to see the larger picture. And while they are still a moderate, Kutet increasingly defers to the Hix party leaders who are more and more radical with every passing year. Simply put, Kutet campaigned honestly as being a good soldier and a terrible politician and is now stuck being politically outfoxed by allies and enemies alike. And while a rebellion seems like a perfect opportunity for Kutet's military proficiency to shine, their enemy (Temezin the Lion) is both unusually competent and very politically savvy - able to use negotiation as a weapon of war to get the Hix tripping over each other. Kutet has come to openly despite their closest ally, Prime Minister Hokinayotzin, more than even their enemies.   The Prime Minister of Kiwa is Chimoda Hokinayotzin, a charismatic and ambitious mage-turned-politician with grand designs and a penchant for self-delusion. Chimoda is unorthodox, full of a puzzling mix of over-the-top showmanship and bravado as well as a very precise erudite intellectualism. Chimoda was once a pamphleteer, a political entertainer, and the face of Hix populism, but they are now deep in a social circle of estate-owners and big ranchers. Chimoda may seem like a vacuous braggart, but they are a keen author and social planner with considerable skill at infrastructure planning and big-picture project coordination. Chimoda sees themselves as a force of change and seeks to endlessly accumulate power to enact their vision of a prosperous Kiwa; they hate being told no, even when it is elite priests or constitutionalists who are telling them that. Chimoda quietly seeks to completely erase the Skoli party, unify the country, and reform the Constitution to end the cycle of partisan infighting. To that end, Chimoda tolerates (and perhaps even prolongs) the ongoing civil unrest as an opportunity to consolidate power and jail their political opponents.   The head priest of Kiwa (the Aziletzen), appointed by an internal priestly elected and confirmed by the Sunekan Spiritual Assembly, is Kapaka Zikinetzin. Kapaka is very politically moderate and has a reputation as a very by-the-books pragmatist. Their primary concern is suppressing heresy in Kiwa and preventing local religious-cultural deviancy from escalating; they care very little for party politics and mostly just want stability to better pursue their mission. Kapaka is fairly stern and intolerant of other beliefs, but is very charitable and grounded when it comes to caring for fellow Sunekans. Kapaka has done an excellent job of caring for wounded people and refugees in the current crisis and their popularity is rising sharply as a result. While they are very well-read personally, Kapaka's greatest flaw as an administrator is their general mismanagement of the school system and educational budget. Kapaka has been very cautious in taking sides between the two parties and has arguably allowed the current constitutional crisis to escalate as it has.   The current Skoli party leader is Ixelis Noxikotzen, an iron merchant and shipping magnate known for their spiteful style of partisan politics. Ixelis seems like a very considerate and calm, even sleepy, leader in many of their meetings, but is shocklingly ruthless and quick behind closed doors. They have been quick to match Chimoda's escalations blow-for-blow and seem very willing to throw the country into civil war to maintain Skoli political power. As a politician, Ixelis seems eager to make Kiwa a 'modern' part of the Sunekan heartlands and considers all other visions of the republic to be irrelevant roadblocks - they are a technocrat who sees the Republic of Akatlan and Republic of Tuzek as the ideal models of government and society. Ixelis has only recently risen to power within the Skoli ranks, after the last party leader was humiliated in how they fumbled the Western revolt.    All four politicians regularly meet in the monthly Small Council.

Kiwan Culture is an odd mix of bellicose Sunekan orthodoxy and local cultural deviance. Kiwans generally divide themselves between Water, Grass, and Stone People based on their region and way of life; each of these groups dress differently and are kept apart. All of them wear different styles of a kind of pointed wool or felt hat (similar to a phrygian cap) - pointed or semi-conical hats are very standard Kiwan fashion. Grass hats often include feathers, Water hats usually include strings or other hanging fabric (like streamers), and mountain hats often include bits of quartz, polished stone, or even bells.   There is a military fetishism in Kiwa that infuses many other sectors of life. Kiwan children are taught from a young age that courage, discipline, focus, and even aggression are key traits for successful people. Military veterans are glamorized and given social preference, and seen as more adult or mature than others.    Kiwan cuisine has an emphasis on ceviche: fish/shellfish/chicken marinated in citrus and sometimes chilis, served cold. Some local ceviche also marinate their meats in fermented banana or passionfruit juice. While there are many local varieties, you can find ceviche with toasted corn just about anywhere in the country in some form or another.

The early lands of Kiwa were divided between many peoples. It was a meeting place of cultures and languages though it was often a battleground as well. The peoples of the Twep River, the coastal forests, the interior plains, the small interior desert, the arid hills, and the foothills of the Adira Mountains were all quite different culturally, religiously, and politically. This was neither harmonious peace nor was it brutal inter-ethnic total warfare, but a place of change, exchange, and conflict. In the Divine Era, around -300 DE, merchants from what is now the Republic of Matayan began to bring elements of Sunekan culture, language, and religion to the coastal regions. Sunekans from abroad began to be associated with agriculture, writing, trade, and industry, and Sunekan language and certain Sunekan rituals were used in elite contexts of the early Kiwan states. But, in the early Modern Era, a new model of organized large-scale semi-urban politics emerged from the Adira Mountains region and began to catch on in the Northern riverlands and mountainous prism-holds of Kiwa. Around 100 ME, a rising kingdom in the North riverlands known as Hugerka emerged and began positioning itself in opposition to the Sunekanized customs. A series of terrible wars followed. Hugerka did not last very long, but it triggered a series of conflicts and movements that continued for nearly a century. People didn't just move away from the conflct, but moved into what is now Kiwa seeking to join or claim various early cities.   Ironically, the conflicts from 100 ME to 300 ME energized trade and led to the creation of a Kiwan political identity. The new federations that dominated the riverlands and coast were not peaceful by 300 ME, but they were much more limited in their violence. These new kingdoms are now remembered as the Tarchalyans, after the greatest city of that era (Tarchalya), though they ascribed to no such label at the time. The Tarchalyans sought to synthesize and merge the various modes of religion and politics at play, from local hill traditions to the Hugerkan mountain traditions to the Sunekans. Their kings were said to rule as mediators and judges first, with much of the daily administration handled by mixed councils. Over the 400s and 500s, two Tarchalyan Kingdoms emerged as the principle powers of Kiwa: the more mixed Tarchayalwala in the East and the more Sunekan-mixed Porzachawala in the West. These two kingdoms claimed vast lands, really only firmly controlled the coastal forests and riverlands.   In 550 ME, a massive invasion struck Kiwa: the Spiritual Empire of All Suneka under the Ghost-King Yezok. The Spiritual Empire conquered the Western kingdom of Porzachawala entirely and marched on Tarchalya. The great city resisted terribly and the ghosts leading the Sunekan forces flew into a vengeful rage. The Sunekans so brutally looted and razed Tarchalya that even Yezok's own priests whispered in dissent. The Sunekan brutality got in the way of conquest and led to many people fleeing from their army instead of submitting. In the end, the overextended and undersupplied Spiritual Empire burned the riverlands and retreated to the coast. This period of chaos and violence has been called the March of Wraiths. The riverlands were conquered by a rising heathen kingdom to the East, and the lands of Kiwa were divided between foreign masters. After the disastrous March of Wraiths, chaos spread to the coastal lands that had once been Porzachawala. The Spiritual Emperor Yezok, growing less coherent and more unyielding in his undeath, declared that Kiwa was a cursed land to be ruled by martial law. A group that Yezok formed, the Texinukla (the Bodies in Redemption), were placed in command of occupied Kiwa (called Sakatluzi at the time). The Texinukla were a group of extremely mutated Starspawn known for their unbridled fanaticism: they believed that their "tainted" minds and souls were "healed" by Sunekan devotion and that their children could be "cured" in body through generational service. Yezok, who had experience in Stildane when he was alive, had formed them himself and they were singularly loyal to him by the early 600s ME. Under the Texinukla, Kiwa was treated as a problem to be solved. Rebellions were frequent and the local Sunekan law was unusually harsh in its application. Even after Yezok's exorcism in 605 ME, the Texinukla retained control and continued many of the more unpopular elements of late-era-Yezok.   One particular Texinukla, Tesmibualek (also called the Liondrake), came to exemplify the Texinukla regime. The Liondrake was a deeply committed war-leader and warrior who live for quite a while despite a multitude of severe health issues. He rose to lead occupied Kiwa through both his military competence and his brutal zeal. The Liondrake forcibly converted the coastal forests and waged a war of annihilation against any interior peoples who refused to convert; massive numbers of people were sent into the Sunekan heartlands as little more than slaves, and many others were slaughtered outright. The Liondrake was able to trigger a religious crisis in the heathen kingdoms to the East, and used a combination of armed threats and relentless evangelism to convert the ruling monarchs of what is now Setepec. The Texinukla were excellent missionaries but economically hobbled their own state. By 700 ME, the Texinukla relied on material support from the Gwalan Republic to remain functional. In 715 ME, Gwalan attempted to use its financial support to incorporate Kiwa into its territory. This led to a brief war with the Texinukla, who saw themselves as the truer heirs to Yezok than the Imperial Electors: by 717 ME, Gwalan had destroyed the occupational government of Kiwa. But the overlords of Gwalan found that Kiwa was more expensive to rule than it was to conquer. Gwalan placed Kiwa under its own provisional vassal-government, which collapsed due to infighting in 730 ME. From 730 to 790 ME, Gwalan had to repeatedly re-assert control to place new vassal governments on the regional throne. When a Sunekan group assumed control in 790 ME without Gwalan's support and declared itself an independent republic, the lords of Gwalan did not fight to retain control in anything but name. This was the first government to call itself Kiwa - a name used by ancient Sunekan merchants to describe the East coast generally. The first Principality of Kiwa was small, unstable, and brief. While the government flourished for a time from 810 to 850 ME, the Kiwan lords began to face Gwalan-sponsored coups, mountain raids from the North, and foreign invasions from the East in the late 800s. In the 900s, the rising kingdom known as the Consensus of Numuya invaded the declining remnants of the Principality. Numuya was a religious movement and empire that claimed to be Sunekan while largely deriving the "true harmonic law" from their own prophet, and mixed together (limited elite) direct democracy, Sunekan republicanism, and theocracy bureuacracy. Sunekan elites to the West accepted Numuya as Sunekan-enough to trade and cooperate with politically, even if they rejected Numuya as heathenous when it suited them as well. At first, Sunekan Kiwans were deeply unhappy with the new regime, but by 1000 Numuya had split into two allied states and West Numuya was far more accomodating for the diverse religious communities of Kiwa. This happy period of co-existence was brief. In 1089, both Numuyan states collapsed into civil war after a failed coup and reunification. As the civil war waged, a group from the Adira Mountains - the Kladakruv - launched an invasion into the Kiwa riverlands. The Kladakruv moved into the lands they conquered and began building their own kingdom in Eastern Kiwa. The Kladakruv leader, Paka Pokli, converted to the Suneka to better mobilize coastal communities to support their rule. By 1200 ME, Paka Pokli's dynasty had reunited Kiwa as the Kingdom of Pakayala.   Pakayala was an odd kingdom, religiously tolerant and deeply monarchical even as it was nominally Sunekan. It, more than any regime before, managed to conquer and incorporate the arid hinterlands. Sunekan communities were led by assigned priest-bureaucrats, while non-Sunekan communities were ruled by members of the royal family assigned to rule as nobles. Sunekans came to ignore the heresies and deviancies of the royal family as long as the priesthood remained dominant in Sunekan-majority territories. The royal cult had some odd Sunekan-Numuyan elements with Calazan overtones, but that mostly reigned in the non-Sunekan Northern riverlands. The Pakayala even got away with inter-Sunekan aggression: they conquered bits of the Republic of Matayan and extracted tribute from the rest. Vitally, the Pakayala maintained a close trade relationship with the greater Sunekan powers and subsidized missionaries into other kingdoms further East.   Pakayala eventually ended when an alliance between priests, merchants, and military officers launched a coup in 1382 that captured the royal family and capital. A brief civil war followed, but in 1385 the new Republic of Kiwa was in total control. The new 'Republic' was still a dynastic kingdom in all but name, ruled by noble cadet branch of the Pakayama that had fully integrated into a Sunekan merchant association. It was still relatively religiously tolerant, though less so than Pakayama. But Suneka was now the formal law of the land once again. The first Kiwa Republic was far more interested in expanding the Suneka through conquest and trade than it was forced conversion at home. With the old Pakayama autonomy structures in place among their own heathens, the Kiwan Tlakra marched Eastward into the unstable kingdoms there. The new Tlakra worked closely with a merchant-priest named Tleletek Unquin, who was deeply invested in Eastward expansion. Tleletek attracted numerous adventurers from the Sunekan heartlands to spread chaos across the East, while the priest themselves used that chaos to justify war. Kiwan soldiers, bolstered by a very active and energetic general of the Guardians of Hokzin named Inatzin, carved a bloody path across the East from 1420 to 1450. Kiwa expanded quickly over the 1440s in particular, but struggled with overextension. And the Guardians of Hokzin betrayed them (in a way): when the rising Eastern Empire of Amatka converted to the Suneka, the Holkara began supporting them to the detriment of Kiwa. The Holkara were also expanding far beyond their ordinary scope, building a large army from the conquests of the East. In 1454, that army marched West to fight for control of the Holkara as an organization, which left a very sharp power vacuum between Kiwa and Amatka.   In 1455, Kiwa and Amatka clashed over control of the lands between them. The war was terrible and ended with the new Empire of Amatka seizing much of the land Kiwa had just conquered. The priests and merchants associated with the agitator Tleletek were able to keep their spoils under the new Amatkan overlords, but the Kiwan royal family and elites had egg on their face. So much blood and debt, to the advantage of so many others. Critique of the royal family, with their hereditary monarchs, religious toleration, and hereditary feudal governors, intensified. In 1520, an "Armed Election" led by coastal elites who wanted more power in the central government exploded into a full on revolution and civil war. Amatka took the opportunity to invade and by 1525 the country was held by foreign rulers once again.   From 1525 to 1900, Kiwa was formally ruled by the Emperors of Amatka. Amatka ruled with a light touch in Kiwa and incorporated many local elites into its new power structures, but the change was still profound. The Amatkan elites considered Kiwa to be a worthy enemy, as Kiwa had defeated Amatkan forces repeatedly in skirmishes - so the Amatkans naturally sought to draw on Kiwa as a military sorce and recruiting ground. Kiwan provinces were drawn on for military service and Kiwan community members who struggled to pay taxes were quickly enlisted in one border skirmish or another. Local religious minorities were pushed into more explicit syncreticism and allowed to make their own formal priesthoods to slowly "harmonize" into greater Suneka. The interior plains were thoroughly absorbed into the mainstream religious community by this, though the Twepec river region only became more religiously distinct and deviant. Part of this is due to local social organization and individual policies, but part of this was thanks to the plain's success in integrating into the Amatkan military.   In 1655, Amatka entered into a civil war. When the civil war finally ended, the empire was reorganized into "Electors" (intended to mirror the decentralization of the Spiritual Empire of All Suneka after the exorcism of Yezok) - Amatka, Kiwa, and Greater Yuska in between them. In the late 1600s, local elite associations thrived while the overall economy of Kiwa stagnated and declined. A series of political reforms (both in Kiwa and the Amatkan Union) slowly improved things. Kiwa began to thrive economically and re-asserted its leading status in the militaries of the other Union partners. Some say that Kiwa "conquered Amatka from within": elites from the other two states migrated into Kiwa and they brought money, people, and political power with them. This 'golden age' is a topic of deep nostalgia for Kiwan elites now, though it was hardly perfect at the time. A terrible war with a mountain coalition in the 1790s was surprisingly destructive, for example, and the new incoming elites locked out local people from social mobility. Social classes calcified and many of the modern social castes that define Kiwan organization became legally entrenched and formalized in this period. And while the investment of the 1700s led to a great deal of prosperity, a sense of malaise and new economic stagnation set in over the 1800s. And then, in 1873, the Great Calazan war changed everything.   From 1870 to 1900, the Empire of Calazen invaded the Sunekan Heartlands in a failed campaign of conquest. In 1876, the Southern half of the Republic of Matayan fell to Calazan forces. Kiwa and the Amatkan Union states were cut off from the rest of the Suneka - and immediately set to work making Calazen struggle. The Calazan forces conquered West Kiwa, but never managed to get far beyond that. For decades, the East stood strong. Kiwa's military specialization intensified and took on new elements: Kiwa's eastern towns began producing chemical weapons and gunpowder in great volumes. In 1888, Kiwa's military completely shattered the Calazan Eastern forces, retook their land, and forced Calazen into a defensive position in South Matayan's mountain passes while Kiwan naval forces ravaged the coastline. Kiwa and the North-Matayan government worked together over the next ten years to completely dismantle the occupying forces, with the last foreign stronghold surrendered in 1898. The great war had ended.   The war left the Amatkan Union exhausted, indebted, and politically taxed. For seven years, people rebuilt. And then in 1905, the ceremonial Emperor of Amatka attempted to re-assert power over the Union members and disbanded the Union Assembly. Kiwa seceded. A brief but bloody war followed, which Kiwa won. The Union was over and Kiwa was free. And yet, the collapse of the Amatkan Union worried many. Kiwa had already been free in many capacities: what now? Kiwa suffered a terrible economic collapse after independence, partially driven by the state's overspecialization in military production and activity. Amatka spent a decade hoping to peacefully pressure Kiwa into rejoining the Union, but the secession of Greater Yuska and a slow Kiwan economic recovery dashed those hopes - and Amatka ended economic hostilities in 1918. The last Union State, Yuska, collapsed not long after and entered a period of terrible civil war from 1919 to 1966. Kiwa periodically joined into the fray (as did Amatka) in hopes of gaining territory, but no long-term gains were made. When peace accords were signed between all former members of the Union in 1966, Amatka and Kiwa began renewing their friendship through new trade and non-aggression deals.   While Kiwa squabbled with the other former Unionists from 1905 to 1966, the Kiwan Tlakra prioritized a different relationship: a close relationship with the liberated Republic of Matayan. Matayan's links to the greater Sunekan financial community were vital for Kiwa's economic recovery and helped link Kiwa to other, more prosperous republics in the heartlands. Kiwa's forces began to be rented out by other republics as semi-mercenaries and Kiwan relationship with the other great martial Republic of Tuzek soldified.   Kiwa's economic and geopolitical recovery may have gone smootly over the last century, but the republic's domestic politics have not been so clean. Following Kiwa's secession from the Amatkan Union, the republic's politics have become increasingly factional. During the 1930 Tlakra election, this factionalism coagulated into two political parties: the Skoli and the Hix. From 1930 to 1968, these political parties were fundamentally split between pro-expansion landlords and pro-peace merchants. The Skoli were the peace party, with ties to Matayan but also to Amatka; they agitated for more investment in shipping fleets, less military spending, more craft production, and more investment in big workshop projects. The Hix were the war party, who were similarly invested in the alliance with Matayan but were actively hostile to Amatka; the Hix campaigned on more military spending, more social mobility for veterans, more power to landowners, more investment in agricultural infrastructure, and more hostility to perceived heresy. The Skoli did well in the West and coastal towns, while the Hix found support in the arid plains and coastal hinterlands. The 1966 Peace Accords ended the question of expansion and represented an absolute political win for the Skoli Party. It was assumed that this would mean the end of formal partisan politics in Kiwa by many, but the system endured. In the 1968 legislative election and 1970 Tlakra election, the Hix radically pivoted from territorial expansion towards military renting and infrastructure projects. The party became less explicitly landowner-oriented or war-hawk and more generally "conservative". This "conservativism" generally translated to a skeptecism of major legal reform, greater respect for old traditional agreements, linking social mobility explicitly to military service, and more investment in infrastructure that benefits the established farms and industries over new factories or trades. At first, the old militarism was still present, but over the 1970s and 1980s that began to wash away. The Skoli also became more militaristic in their own right, as they competed with the Hix to be the party of military-rentals as those became more popular among high-impact voters. As the Skoli militarized, they became much more of a "free enterprise" and 'merchant-industrialist' party. The Hix responded by embracing trade protectionist policies to better shelter smaller merchants from imports and to increase subsidies and resource support for un-profitable sectors. By 1990, the Hix and Skoli had transitioned fully from war and peace factions to landed conservative vs industrial liberal factions (though such foreign ideological labels risk losing much of the Sunekan nuance).    This re-alignment of party politics was further complicated by a series of scandals in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1970, a notable merchant by the name of Kalakitzu Pechituk with close business ties to the landlords and military establishment of the far West (notably, the city of Itlachin) as well as to the Apatlia Finance Cult of the Republic of Matayan called together his contacts to finance an intervention in the civil war going on in Matayan at the time. Kalakitzu, despite being an outspoken Skoli, dove into the Matain civil war with violent ambition and many assumed that he would try to incorporate conquered territories into Kiwa. Kalakitzu's early successes in capturing the old Matain capital of Amaradzi proved popular in Kiwa, and the Skoli went from condemning their wayward member to openly supporting him. Despite this outward support, internally, the Skoli were deeply divided on the matter of Kalakitzu - as were the Hix. The question of annexing Southern Matayan or respecting Kalakitzu's republic became a pressing political question. Ultimately, Matayan remained sovereign after Kalakitzu ended their civil war and was crowned Tlakra in 1979. Relations normalized from 1979 to 2009 between the two countries, though Kalakitzu's allies were given special access in the looting of Matayan's resources and profitable surplus.    The Kalakitzu Situation created a new political bloc: the far West, which began to form a regional political identity. Despite the Far West being a relatively small and hilly region, the looting of Matayan gave the area a prominent commercial position. The West already had its own sense of local identity as well, inherited from their traumatic experiences of Calazan occupation and resistance. The local Guardians of Hokzin had also inherited substantial lands and political power from the war and the local Chapterhouses were very politically involved with the other local elites. The region served as a training and manufacturing center for the Holkara, and it grew rapidly from Kalakitzu's patronage and attempts by both the Hix and Skoli to buy Holkara support. Kiwa had always been the armory of the East, but Western Kiwa was becoming the armory of that armory - producing guns, chemical weapons, and armor for the pseudo-mercenaries that Kiwa sent abroad as well as for the Eastern Grandmaster of the Guardians of Hokzin.   Over the 1990s, the Western bloc held disproportionate sway over Kiwan politics and their politicians worked tirelessly to translate that influence into regional subsidies and favorable policies. The Skoli, who gained near-total government power in 1994 thanks in part to the Western Bloc, invested heavily in the West and established the region as a Skoli bastion - all while the interior and Twepec felt increasingly left behind. Skoli policies in the East that theoretically favored local farmworkers by challenging the power of big estates, in practice could leave those farmworkers in a less secure place. Estate audits often were accompanied with anti-heretical inspections and population re-assignments, which broke apart families and led to the old Twepec river traditions coming under attack. Skoli policies similarly dragged interior artisan communities into big coastal craft communes. On paper, all of this was ordinary Sunekan-in-practice, but it disrupted the unspoken status quo that had been estalished arguably as far back as the 1200s. The Skoli assumed that this would have little meaningful political consequence, as local elites mediated the voting process and the poorest of Kiwa had deeply restricted political power. To the Skoli, these policies helped the middle classes and new-rich challenge the old rich - it was a matter of old versus new, not even related to matters of heresy or the whims of the poor. But outrage from the lowest levels created a slew of problems, many of which were mishandled. The Skoli doubled down and began trying to find ways to retain power despite a crisis of popularity over the 2000s. The Skoli finally lost that grip in 2010 and a protectionist, traditionalist, nostalgic Hix movement swept into legislative power and a moderate Hix Tlakra was elected.   The new Hix regime immediately began prioritizing the East and the interior. While they were hesitant to de-prioritize the whole coastal forest region (which was important for both political parties), Hix propaganda had already painted the Western bloc as the perfect scapegoat that represented all the hypocrisy and problems of the Skoli government. The Hix began physically uprooting workshops and work communities to forcibly relocate to their own favored regions - sometimes with very poor logistical consideration, leading to their immediate abandonment. The Western bloc reacted with outrage and fury; some communities went so far as to relocate to the Matain border, where they could claim to be subjects of Kalakitzu. In 2014 the situation escalated, as the moderate Tlakra was completely outfoxed by the more radical Prime Minister and pressured into a complete restructuring of the Western provincial government. This led to a constitutional crisis, as there were legal ambiguities as to whether the central government could dismiss elected local representatives and governors. During the lawsuit, a local vote was held without government approval to elect a popular figure at the center of the controversy (the over-Mayor of the Iltachin province) to Governor of all the West. The local Holkara stepped in as peacekeepers and demanded a peaceful resolution to the crisis as long as neighboring Matayan continued to be in civil war. An armed standoff between Holkara and government soldiers ended with a tentative government withdrawal. Excited Westerners began mobilizing in force, eager to capitalize on Hixi political weakness. The Tlakra and Prime Minister returned to open infighting, but united to try and pick apart the Western Bloc before it gained more traction. In 2015 the united Hix successfully lobbied the Holkara Grandmaster to dismiss and replace the regional Holkara Chaptermaster, the ambitious General-Master Temezin, to remove the Holkara from regional politics and allow for a more forceful solution. De-politicizing the Holkara was supposed to de-escalate the situation by deflating the West while the Tlakra offered them a more accomodating and moderate solution. None of the politicians expected what followed.   Following the Grandmaster's Order of 2015, General-Master Temezin of the Guardians of Hokzin rebelled against his orders and went rogue with his full forces. He took the West with him, which rebelled openly against what they deemed unconstitutional actions in removing elected officials. These forces joined together with Kalakitzu's forces in Matayan, forming a united armed front. The Skoli Party condemned this as effectively an act of secession and demanded unity. Kiwan government forces moved quickly to try and capture Temezin and the city of Itlachin (with Skoli and popular support) but completely underestimated the fortifications at Itlachin and the rebel forces; Temezin then launched a devastating counter-attack and captured a prominent Kiwan general before his forces retreated to Matayan. Temezin then used this hostage to try and broker a ceasefire. The Tlakra then tried to bribe Temezin into joining the moderate Hix, which led to the government largely being strung along until the amateurish intrigue was leaked to the public. All of this government incompetence provoked outrage. The Skoli party went from embarassed condemnation of the rebellion to half-supportive sympathy, as they argued that Hix could easily peace at minimal cost. Fighting was on-and-off over 2015 and nearly ended in early 2016. Kalakitzu's death and replacement as Tlakra of Matayan by the rebel-Holkara General Temezin in mid-2016 restarted the conflict.    Since 2016, what was a relatively minor provincial autonomy revolt has become something more. Failures to properly hold elections in late 2016 created outrage among the more militaristic Skoli politicians, and local dissenters across Kiwa are considering more direct forms of action. The Kiwan government has largely contained the rebellion but have not squashed it despite having far more people and resources. Not only is Temezin an excellent strategist with good officers, but the Kiwan government is terrified of getting sucked into the full violent chaos of the Matain civil war. After a failed attempt by the Guardians of Hokzin to capture Temezin, no greater Sunekan army has come to suppress the rogue Holkara. Temezin represents a kind of inter-Holkara populism, a resentment among the rank-and-file warrior-monks against high command, and the Grandmaster seems to be afraid of legitimizing Temezin's more extreme followers' opinions by mobilizing against him - he is safer as a local warlord than a martyr, and that's assuming he'd lose. Failures to suppress the rebellion has legitimized it across Kiwa. Even the Hix are divided: the Tlakra and the Prime Minister's sub-factions are openly sabatoging each other.    Kiwa is not yet in total civil war. Mobilizations have been limited and negotiation remains a possibility as of 2018 ME. Conversion of Temezin 'The Lion' by Dina, the Martyr may change the nature of this conflict.

Around 5.7 million people live in Kiwa. Over 4 of million of these people live in 'Core Kiwa'; the rest are mostly split between upper Twepec and the Kaznara plains. The population is roughly 30% Dryad, 25% Human, 20% Prism, 15% Hybrid, 5% Kobold, and 5% Other.   Of the three main 'castes' of Kiwa, the Agriculturalist class is easily the largest, followed by the Mountain class, with the Semi-pastoralists composing the smallest population.

Kiwa is a fairly large country, 520 miles across East to West. The western sections average about 245 miles North-South, while the Twepec river region goes over 380 miles North of the coast.   Kiwa can be broken into several major regions:

• 'Core Kiwa' is the most populated and 'developed' cultural heartlands of the Republic. It is a mix of the forested coastal area, western hills, and lower eastern riverlands. This is heavily farmed warm temperate forest with frequent light rains from the Southern ocean. Most of Kiwa's urban centers are in this area.
• The Kaznara Plains are arid grasslands, flat for the most part but hilly in the west.
• The Twepec riverlands are seasonally humid and seasonally arid; the surrounding areas are arid shrubland and desert, but the river is the center of its own ecosystem fed year-round by Northern snowmelt.
• The mixed ecotone doesn't have a formal name, but represents a fluid mix of plains, forest, hills, desert, and mountains.
• The Tlenwa desert is a small arid flatland, loosely controlled by the Republic
• The Adiran mountains borderlands are mountainous areas that are tenuously controlled by the state, and mostly belong to local autonomous communities.

Across these broad region, there are seventeen provinces, as shown below  

The Kiwan army is excessively large for a country of its size; not only does this standing army patrol the Northern borders and act as a military policing force, but large numbers of soldiers are rented out to foreign republics. Military service is a fairly consistent part of many people's lives and is sometimes even seen as a right of passage for youths in some communities. Service is often associated with social mobility, though that promised social ascent is rarer than advertised. What part of the army one was assigned to is often considered a major part of a person's identity, and is a major presence in urban socialization.    The Kiwan army itself prioritizes balance among its forces: the balance and cooperation between infantry, ranged specialists, and cavalry is seen as the key to victory. Mobility is key to all of these groups; infantry and ranged warriors train relentlessly in endurance sprinting, and often use wagons or horses to deploy vanguard forces quickly on the battlefield. Artillery is seen as the coup de grace reserved for the end of battles or for sieges: corner the enemy, then bring in the cannons and poison gas to eradicate them. Kiwan tactics often prioritize relentless aggression; those who act win, while those who react lose.    While the officer corps are relentlessly drilled to understand combined arms as the key to success, elite units serve as powerful symbols of Kiwan professionalism and competency. The Guardians of Hokzin are, of course, one of the symbols - but not the only one. The Spirit Rangers, a group of lancers, mobile infantry, and sharpshooters, are also currently used as a symbol of Kiwan excellence. The Spirit Rangers prioritize mobility, stealth, and interpersonal combat - with their own mix of cavalry, infantry, and ranged to mirror the broader army. They are often deployed on the Northern frontier to quickly identify and crush raiders from the Adira Mountains, but they are sometimes sent out for particularly flashy operations abroad. The Rangers are supposedly invincible, which isn't true but still seems to be accepted as common fact. This can lead to all sorts of fiction when the Rangers fail - for example, in the current rebellion, rumors have abounded that the Rangers are voluntarily choosing not to crush the rebels out of a sense of sympathy.    Kiwa's navy is also fairly capable; much like the army, Kiwa's ships and marines are paid by other republics to patrol the Southern seas.

Kiwa is a republic that constantly and belligerently asserts its Sunekan orthodoxy and zeal and presents itself as a weapon of Sunekan religious expansion - even as Kiwa is domestically divided between multiple forms of cultural-religious deviancy. The current State Priest, or Aziletzen, has been trying to quietly enforce orthodox Suneka at home without provoking social unrest, but this has mostly led to Kiwans better hiding their faiths rather than mass conversions. It is worth noting that Kiwan religious deviancy is not a form of Sunekan heresy: these are primarily folk traditions and cultural traditions that fall outside of the orthodox Sunekan way of life that Kiwans see as perfectly Sunekan. These are not alternative religions or organized criticisms of Sunekan orthodoxy. Kiwa has spent many centuries promoting Suneka abroad while tolerating diverse ethnic and religious identities at home, so local communities see all this as very traditionally Sunekan and see attempts to purge them as the newfangled deviancy.   There are generally three main tolerated folk traditions in Kiwa: the Akasteo Cult, the Pasalada Cult, and the Pagarnam Cult

• The Akasteo Cult, common in the interior plains, was once also the religion of the Western coasts. Akasteo is an ancient God of weather, rain, wind, and hurricanes who had three primary aspects in ancient religion: war, fertility, and knowledge/crafts/preservation. The Akasteo Cult used complex dances and earthworks to emulate the winds and encouraged martial training for men coming of age. 
• The Pasalada Cult was common in the Eastern riverlands of Twepec, as it is said that the Supreme God Pasalada lived in the river and used it to give prophecy to those who lived entangled with the river. Pasalada was said to be of two forms, the masculine fire and the feminine river/water, and that all true Gods are aspects of these forms. The Fire of Pasalada was said to be the Chimera while the Water was Halcyon; the mountains were regarded as sacred, with monks encouraged to meditate in the rivermelt snows.
• The Pagarnam Cult is the tradition of the mountainfolk, notably the Prisms and Pearl Pangolins, who believed that the first generation of Gods (the Pagarnam) were sleeping under the mountains and would one day return. Pagarnam tradition is about private-facing and family-oriented religion, protecting dead kin as they journey to the Pagarnam's side and maintaining hearthside shrines. Pagarnam traditions are inherently syncretic and was usually practiced alongside one of the other two.

Only the most curmudgeonly and intolerant priests take issue with the Akasteo tradition, as it has thoroughly syncretized with mainstream Suneka at this point. Indeed, population transfers within Kiwa have spread and standardized a kind of pseudo-Akasteo tradition across Kiwa and even into countries further East. The issue mostly comes from those who keep to the older ways more rigidly and refuse to accept the Sunekan names for things - a practice that is ironically common among the mercenaries and soldiers of Kiwa. The plains peoples, legally known as the Grass People, have long kept their Akasteo Cult alive in a purer form than would normally be accepted. However, the Hix political party has championed this tradition as a valid form of Suneka and as a form of righteous military cult.    Far more concerning to the priesthood is the Pasalada Cult, which remains fairly strong in Northern Twepec. The Pasalada cult remains strong in the irrigation committees of the riverlands and often have illegal temples and priests who keep the old ways alive. Local land-owning groups tolerate and even patronize these temples as a way to win over the loyalty and obedience of their workers; temple networks act as a way for local groups to coordinate business, work, and other elements of life that aren't trusted to the mainstream priests or government. Nearly all of these temples and worshippers also see themselves as Sunekan, but they fundamentally reject the idea of forced mobility: they see their Harmony as tied to the river and the river as the center of the world. The overt un-Sunekan religion of the Pasalada cult makes it the top priority target for outside priests.    The Pagarnam cult is virtually invisible and flies under the radar, but is concerning to those who know of it: the inherently private nature makes it hard to identify and the focus on kinship quietly subverts the basic social structures of the Suneka. And yet, in the mountains where prisms and prism-hybrids live so much more effectively, it is difficult to truly force a Sunekan-heartlands model without having to rely on local people who can easily subvert the government's intent.    In ancient days, all three cults overlapped and were practiced by Kiwan communities together. Sacred trinaries have always been a major cultural force in Kiwa, and having this religion with three distinct-but-connected components fit that. Each part did have a local regional component, but the cults didn't stick to their designated region and people were generally expected to move between the coast, river, and hills. The full seperation of all three cults into isolated traditions was a result of centuries of Sunekanization, which isolated and regionalized the local religion's cults. Mainstream Sunekan rituals, holidays, and temples are all common in everyday life across the republic. Within that mainstream, Kiwa has some local quirks. Notably, Kiwa has a particular emphasis on three Paragon Spirits/Gods: Hokzin the Guardian Lion, Yamati the Tree of Abundance, and Tetzin the Preserving Stone. These three are everywhere in local symbols, temple architecture, and local ceremonies. Hokzin is invoked in matters of animal husbandry, trade, conflict, movement, and courage; Yamati with matters of fertility, fortune, weather, crops, and health; and Teztin in matters of knowledge, crafts, stability, endurance, survival, and wisdom.    Monastic orders to Hokzin, Yamati, and Tetzin are all prolific here as a result. The Guardians of Hokzin have a substantial presence here (and have for many centuries) and own considerable estates across the country - they also have substantial influence over the military and mercenary structures. The Cult of Tetzin is highly involved in local mineral extraction and trade, and the Keepers of Yamati are highly invested in the local indigo industry and irrigation efforts.   Kiwan Suneka is not just shaped by ancient traditions, but by its historical connections to the Eastern Sunekan Union (a grand union of states from Kiwa to the far Eastern fringes) which only ended in the early 1900s. The legacy of the ESU means that there are underground shrine-tomb-houses for Ghosts "bound" to the will of the government in many cities and temples, the Lunar God Wimbo Aizitu is more widely venerated as a warrior-ancestor (often associated with the Guardian Lion), and there is a greater emphasis on sacred intoxication during religious festivals.

While Kiwa's state-mediated mercenaries have built numerous connections, the republic's partisan politics have dashed most of their more serious diplomatic relationships. Kiwa is now relatively isolated, though it is certainly not a pariah state.     Kiwa is a well-connected republic, with numerous friendly relationships but few serious allies. The republic has a strong connection to the Republic of Matayan that has collapsed with Matayan's civil war. In the 1990s, Kiwa had an alliance with the Republic of Tuzek, but that collapsed during the party change of the 2010s. Now, Tuzek has taken a more aggressive stance towards Kiwa that seems to be leading towards eventual rivalry. As a reaction to this, Kiwa is tentatively aligning itself with the Republic of Atupan and Republic of Akatlan, though this alliance is fresh and not a deep commitment.   Kiwa has a long and complex relationship with the countries to its East: Kiwa is a very close diplomatic and trade partner to the Republic of Amatka, and the two countries have a non-aggression and military cooperation treaty to maintain peace and political status quo across the Eastern Sunekan coast. However, Amatka very clearly desires more from the relationship than Kiwa's ruling Hix party is willing to give - particularly, a renewed Eastern Sunekan Union.

Kiwa has a fairly complex legal system, as it categorizes all people into roughly five categories:

• Heathen outsiders, who are defined by their foreignness
• Sunekan foreigners, who are generally welcomed but denied certain citizen privileges
• Water People, people from local lowland sedentary communities
• Grass People, people involved in ranch work or semi-nomadic life on the plains or desert
• Rock People, people from highland sedentary communities

with different legal standards for each. These differences are fairly subtle and relatively minor for the most part, though each group is expected to dress differently to mark their status.    Another local legal quirk is the government's fixation on registering and controlling magic use. All forms of magic use must require government permission or licensing - often down to the individual spell being cast. Trusted elites can easily acquire very broad and permissible licenses, but foreign interlopers need to grease a lot of palms if they want to use magic more casually. While Hedge Magic is also legally regulated on paper, very little energy is spent trying to actually enforce the law in those cases.    This gets particularly intense when it comes to God-blooded sorcerers. Descendents of god-blooded sorcerers need to report any children to a national registry, and most of these children are subject to testing after puberty for potential magical aptitude. If a child does indicate aptitude, they are typically taken to a military academy for training and indoctrination; god-blooded sorcerers are essentially state property.    As a result on this fixation with magical control, Kiwa operates the Nakashuana: the Prison of Witches. This is one of the most effective prisons for magic-users, with carefully constructed facilities for warlocks, bards, druids, paladins, wizards, monks, and sorcerers. The Prison of Witches is a symbol of the state's ability to control and contain even the most individually powerful people, and the wardens proudly tout their successful imprisonment of a handful of remarkable individuals given powerful blessings by the Demigod Mavara. The Nakashuana accepts prisoners from across the Suneka and sometimes even beyond, though many prisoners actually spend the majority of their time being rented as magical labor elsewhere. Only a handful of symbolically important prisoners spend their days in the ominous-looking complex; the Republic is far more interested in their re-indoctrination and labor as fruitful memers of society. But the prison is an important piece of propaganda and part of the republic's self-image as a Guardian Against Chaos.

Kiwa, like most countries, is majority agricultural. Across the coast, people grow maize, rice, gourds, beans, and numerous assorted vegetables. Wheat and maize are grown in the interior, and potatoes are common across the entire country. In the interior plains, cattle ranching and horse ranching are common. Sudraco ranching is a recent industry along the riverlands.   The coast produces a great deal of cotton, as well as flax, tobacco, and some indigo.   The Western hills are rich in iron, copper, and lead, which are used to produce numerous weapons for sale across the Suneka. In the Western hills and in the Eastern riverlands, Kiwa also has several large Chemical Weapons foundries, which produce chlorine and mustard gas canisters for military use and sale across the Suneka.

Like in much of the Suneka, monetary exchange and free market commerce is reserved for non-essential goods and services, and usually divided between two markets: the 'little economy' of small peddlers and farmers between each other, and the 'big economy' of wealthy elites.   The 'big economy' in Kiwa is a massive force, with a substantial impact on the local 'small economy' of everyday life. The Kiwan state operates a large trading fleet to transport goods and uses their state-sponsored mercenaries (Kiwan soldiers rented abroad) to better negotiate trade deals. Especially since the Republic of Matayan is in shambled, Kiwan fleets and merchants handle much of the trade movement between the Eastern Republics and the Sunekan Heartland. This has all made trade protectionism a hot topic in Kiwan politics, as large volumes of foreign goods pose a serious threat to local artisan communities.   Production of goods is handled by the Department of Abundance, which appoints Crafts Committees and Merchant Associations to provinces to handle craft production, transport, and sale.

Like most Sunekan republics, Kiwa has a public education system for all youth under 17 with a focus on writing, math, religion, and civics. Kiwa's education system is underfunded and not entirely well-run. Most commoners end their education early here, between ages 12 to 16, with more emphasis placed on literacy and discipline than math, science, or academics. Many rural Kiwan schools emphasize "vocational" education and more or less push children into apprenticeships and work. Military academies are much better funded than the civilian school system, though these tend to prioritize youth of particular skill or who are identified as "officer material". While Kiwa is still mostly literate, the republic has a reputation for being under-educated.   The most well-funded and prestigious military academies focus on magic, engineering, and military skills. Kiwa's educational focus has led to a larger number of mages than usual, all government-controlled. These magic users often end up entering politics (the Prime Minister, for example, is a very successful bard). While some poor youth of particular talent end up in these academies, those cases are rare.