Artillery Batteries

Numbers of crew per battery fluctuated a bit in the era. However, the Russians used 10 crew per gun for light batteries. Heavy batteries used 12 crew per gun. For the smaller pieces the Russians used 4 horses and 8 for the larger. In the US Civil War, gun batteries were also six artillery pieces and were equipped with 112 horses. 6 were used to carry each gun, meaning 36 were slotted for this task. Another 36 were used for the field forge and battery wagon. 40 were mounts for officers and replacements should others become too sick. We can assume then that the Wild Men raids would send some of the stolen horses to Isengard for the artillery wing.   In the US Civil War, gun batteries were also six artillery pieces. Each gun had 32 projectiles. One battery wagon and one field forge was attached to each battery. However, there was 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 14 non commissioned officers, 11 support staff and 125 privates. 52 of these were drivers and 70 worked the guns. 112 horses were attached as well. 6 were used to carry each gun, meaning 36 were slotted for this task. Another 36 were used for the field forge and battery wagon. 40 were mounts for officers and replacements should others become too sick.   Now, how many guns would Isengard have? Russia had 6 per 1,000 men – the record for the Napoleonic period. Their infantry batteries were either light or heavy. Light ones had 160 men and either eight 6 pound guns and four 10 pound howitzers or 6 of each. Heavy ones had 240 men and four each of 6 pound guns, 12 pound guns and 20 pound howitzers.   There were two “batteries” of rocket troops in the British Army with 178 troops each. If they are used by Isengard, then there would be 356 soldiers with these weapons.   Isengard had 10,000 uruk hai at Helm’s Deep. He lost between 4,000 and 5,000 at the battles for the Fords of Isen. This means at peak strength Saruman’s would have been 15,000 uruk hai. With the Russian ratio, we get 90 artillery pieces. Given the fact that attacking Helm’s Deep would be the primary objective, the heavy batteries would be the main model used. This means 28 each of 6 and 12 pounders and 20 pound howitzers. Borrowing from Russia means requiring at most 72 six pounders and 54 ten pound howitzers. Due to the overlap on the 6 pounders, I would suspect that the higher 72 number would be used to give tactical flexibility. This means a total of 182 pieces manufactured, but only 90 would be deployed based on context.   Due to the numbers of people involved per battery, a field army would require 1,600 men and 1,680 would be needed for the heavy batteries. The crew would be 1,080 and the support crew would be the other 600. Now as the crew would need to be well trained and professional, I would imagine that the gunners would be uruk hai. Meanwhile the support staff could be filled with orcs or wild men. In the Battles of the Fords of Isen, Saruman mobilized at least 2,000 wild men and at worst case scenario he had 500 left, this does not sound unreasonable.

German divisions in 1914 started with 3 heavy, 6 medium and 12 light mortars. The light mortars were eventually moved into infantry formations. Meanwhile specialized artillery companies of 4 heavy and 8 medium mortars. Further refinements in 1916 saw division level artillery consist of 12 light howitzers. They also had 7.7 cm field guns organized into 6 batteries with 6 guns or 9 batteries with 4 guns. At the corps level, there were 12 heavy field howitzers, 4 heavy mortars and 8 heavy field guns.   Heavy Russian artillery batteries in the Napoleonic period had 12 guns per battery, for about 7 complete total batteries. By the time of World War One, the technical specifications of the guns changed, but the numbers per battery surprisingly did not change much. Then, divisions had batteries with 8 field guns and the corps level had 4 or 6 howitzers. For our division sized army of uruks attacking Helm's Deep, this works out surprisingly close.   Now, the British doctrine during the war suggests a 4 gun howitzer battery should be responsible for bombarding an area 180 yards wide and 3,000 feet deep. They were expected to fire 800 shells a day for 5 days. This comes out to a whopping 4,000 shells or one per 1.5 yards of enemy trench. In quiet periods, it appears that densities of all gun types of 45 yards was normal. But concentrations were common in battles to maximize destructive power.   To highlight this, at Battle of the Somme, the British had a 14 mile front with 143 heavy, 284 medium and 1,010 field guns. They fired 1,732,873 shells. At Arras, they had a 13 mile front with 301 heavy, 663 medium and 1,854 field guns. They fired 2,687,873 shells. For Messines, there was a 9 mile front with 236 heavy, 504 medium and 1,510 field guns. They fired 3,258,000 shells. Finally at Third Ypres, the front was 15 miles with 143 heavy, 718 medium and 2,092 field guns which fired 4,283,550 shells.   This means that by the end of the war, the British could reasonably be expected to bring 1 heavy gun every 67 to 184.62 yards. Medium ones could be placed between 31.4 and 86.76 yards. Field guns could be between 10.5 yards and 24.4 yards. The shells fired every day per gun were between 4.2 and 283.4.   I mention all these seemingly boring and meaningless numbers because the Deeping Wall is not that long. At Helm's Deep, the entire length of exposed wall is 400 feet. You read that right - 400 feet not 400 yards. If we run these numbers for the Russian gun battery numbers I apply to Isengard's army, we get an absurd in the extreme number of 4.76 yards per each class of gun. Or just short of 1.6 yards per gun if.   Now, lets assume all 90 guns I cite as being part of the army show up to Helm's Deep and average 2 shells per minute in the first 30 minutes and 1 per minute after that. That gives us a total number of shells fired at Helm's Deep of 1,560 in a single day. So, the rate of fire would not be First World War levels of intense. But for Napoleonic level technology, this would be impressive none the less. Especially when Isengard is going up against a solid stone wall - something notoriously weak against cannons.

Tactically, there are two main ways to use artillery. The first is as a blunt instrument meant to bludgeon the enemy. The goal is to destroy the enemy by burying them under the sheer weight of shells. But this tends not work work well in most contexts. Instead, I will be focusing on the second option. This one is more of an area denial and suppression weapon. The idea here is simply make it too risky to do anything in a target area. If the enemy can't move, they are functionally defenseless even if their men are still alive. This allows infantry to move closer to the enemy positions before they are exposed to enemy defensive actions. The second option is much more temporary. But much more likely to work.   So, lets refresh on French artillery doctrine. The goal is to fire at the enemy center with 1 to 2 rounds per minute at ranges of 80-200 yards for 20-30 minutes. Once the enemy lines broke, infantry charges were to exploit the opening. Bombardments alone rarely win battles – they exist to make infantry charges possible. Because of the up close and personal attacks on massed enemy infantry without cover, tactics focus on direct fire of targets they can see. These field guns require constant and safe ammunition supplies that are able to keep up with them. If they can't keep this, the guns running out of shells will rob the attack of momentum. This means essentially ever increasing causalities and ever declining territorial gains. Something that would come to be a major limiting factor in First World War attacks.   By World War One, tactics evolved to rely on heavy rounds of high explosive to break morale through sheer intensity of fire. Essentially, artillery became even more of a blunt weapon. High explosives, arcing fire aiming at areas that could not be seen by gunners and the huge weight of the guns meant they were only practically stationary and placed in the rear during battles. This also meant a loss of accuracy. While range finding and aerial photography to improve maps meant accuracy could be improved, the reality was that heavy artillery remained a blunt instrument meant to attack areas rather than specific targets. These tactics relied on indirect arcing fire, heavier shells, high explosive ordinance, spotters, range finding, dedicated battery protection and counter battery fire. As a result of the increased ranges, batteries needed their own dedicated protection. Often, the infantry would be far in front, thus not able to protect the batteries directly. Secondly, the enemy artillery could just shoot over the infantry on both sides for counter battery attacks.   Due to the uniqueness of cannons in Middle Earth, the same basic idea can be copied without the reliance on high explosive. But to pull this off, it was apparently required to pull off high density of guns and high rates of fire. Due to quick fire guns and smokeless powder not being part of Isengard's arsenal, I would suspect that the basics of French Napoleonic doctrine would have to be adapted. But this is not that much of a stretch. The World War One bombardments were recognized at the time for losing their shock value after a few hours. So the short periods of high intensity bombardments of the French would still fit with this.   One major limitation of the French doctrine mentioned above is its reliance on direct fire. It was very good against infantry. But against fortified or concealed targets, it was not so good. This is where the World War One era tactics have an advantage. But World War One tactics had to rely on rigid time tables and huge amounts of shells. They lacked the flexibility needed for fast paced battlefield conditions or to handled unexpected resistance or targets of opportunity. So, I would suspect Isengard would be using French Napoleonic tactics in open battles but World War One tactics at Helm's Deep.   But one major problem with these intense attacks is they kinda telegraphed that an attack was coming. Anyone would know pretty quickly that they were under attack and would be able to get troops into protected positions. Which allowed generals to send reinforcements to the sector in question. Relatively few troops would die after the initial shells fell. The rest would rise out of their bunkers shortly after the barrage lifted - then able to return to their positions and repel the attackers. Which they now know are coming. Hence the utility of creeping barrages.   So barrages, if not handled right, could in fact lead to a targeted area being stronger. For this reason, In both World War On and French Napoleonic doctrine the role of coordination with infantry is stressed. Bombardments alone rarely win battles – they exist to make infantry charges possible. Essentially, artillery can sit there and be a blunt instrument, indiscriminately hammering entire enemy positions. But they are primarily offensive tools, much like longbows. To pull off these attacks, there was a need for strong command and control recognized in the French Army. But the follow though on this was harder than one would expect, due to the loudness of artillery and the smoke they produce. This is partly why the French demanded the up close and personal bombardments. This had the benefit of aiding the cooperation with infantry.   At close ranges, the artillery was exposed to both counter battery and small arms fire. So the infantry the artillery was supporting was essential for protection of the guns. Should this infantry line be broken, direct charges and flank attacks became a threat. After all, the longer time to reload an artillery piece means that a lot of ground can be covered between shots. Without the infantry backup, artillery was surprisingly exposed to simply being rushed by men with swords or bayonets.   When engaged in open battles, the infantry is required to work closely with and tightly coordinate with artillery. Artillery too needs infantry to provide protection against enemy attacks. An artillery based style of attack aims at cutting through enemy defenses so that the main attacking force can just march right in. Thus walls and enemy artillery or archery fire would be knocked out. So at first, the infantry is to support the artillery, making sure attacks are not able to silence the artillery. Artillery then aims to break the enemy units apart. It matters not if this is from high causalities causing holes in the line to form or a loss of morale. However it occurs, the second the enemy ranks are shattered by the artillery, infantry is meant to press the attack on the new weak point prior to any possibilities of reorganization of the enemy ranks. This would normally come after 20-30 minutes of intense bombardment.   Several tactics were developed to get around the telegraphing issue. First, they could not escape the need to strike hard and fast. This would mean the highest rate of fire possible and the highest weight of each round as possible for maximum damage as fast as possible. The idea would be of an initial hard bombardment aimed at forming an opening on the walls that could be stormed by the uruks before the defenders could react. Thus some fire would be directed against the walls and some at suppressing any infantry massing inside for possible containing any breech.   Shooting based on maps was another tactic. If you know exactly where the enemy position is, they can be more easily hit. But this mainly works for buildings. Anything that can move is not stationary to be placed on a map well enough for artillery. It also requires much better intelligence. This tactic, while having its downsides, also allows for an increase in surprise if done right. Before barrages conducted traditionally, the gunners would fire a few rounds at the enemy to essentially test their aim. But this warned the enemy that the attack was coming, meaning accuracy and surprise could be seriously reduced and with it the ability to eliminate enemy troops and guns. The area denial role still applies, but valuable opportunities to actually kill the enemy is lost.   It must be noted that this is only as good as the maps. The worse the maps, the worse the accuracy and thus utility of the barrage. In World War One, this was often done with photographs taken from planes. But Saruman's spy activities can fill this role too. But if it works, it seems to work quite well.   Now, it must be noted that it was learned towards the end of the war that destruction of the enemy positions was too much to ask for artillery. Technically, killing all enemies and destroying their positions was possible. Just horrifically expensive and time consuming. So they learned that artillery was better at suppressing fire. Which is why you see a shift from the days and weeks long bombardments like at Somme to the hurricane barrages lasting 30 minutes. The idea was to cut communications, keep enemy reinforcements from arriving and to force the front line defenders to hide. A short but intense barrage at the right time that came as as much of a surprise as possible became ideal.   To get around the subtly problem, the German artillery began to use a three phase attack aimed at stunning and suppressing enemy troops instead of using the artillery to completely destroy the enemy. This means infantry attacks after only hours of bombardment instead of the days used earlier in World War One. This shift saw the first phase aimed at cutting enemy communications. The second phase was to bomb enemy artillery and machine guns – basically suppressing and counter battery fire. Then, major troop concentrations would be hit to keep the opening vulnerable enough to be penetrated. I would imagine that Isengard's artillery would follow similar guidelines in sieges, except adding in smaller caliber fire on gate houses.   The suppressing fire into the interior of enemy positions would probably require indirect fire. It is possible for wild men or orcs to serve as forward observers, calling back to the gunners how to more effectively aim inside the walls. This is actually possible, as the heavier guns of World War One could fire further than the lighter caliber guns of the same era – up to 30 km for the heavy guns and 8 for the field guns that dominated the earlier stages of the war. But the super guns of the same era could fire 846.5 pounds and the record was an 81 mile range.   A sudden hurricane bombardment would be ideal fro breaking the front ranks of enemy formations in the field. Gatehouse would be the secondary priority, as would the interior. When it appears a good time for the main infantry or cavalry attack, fire would switch to a creeping barrage to cover advancing troops. The creeping barrage is a tactic that sees the infantry marching towards the enemy as artillery bombards just in front of them. Effectively this would be solid suppressing fire. The enemy would not be able to effectively counterattack while the attacking forces advance.   Ideally, they keep the enemy in their protected positions until the attacking infantry are able to close the gap and attack them directly in their bunkers. Or the enemy is outright killed. Either way, the attackers win. But without close coordination, there is a risk of shells landing on friendly troops. Or the gap between the barrage and the attacking troops grows too wide for the suppression to be useful. The standards of the era seem to be three shrapnel rounds per minute. Every 3-5 minutes, the aim would be moved 100 yards forward. Sometimes, this was set at 50 yards every 1 minute. Especially when combined with a solid box barrage, these could sweep the entire enemy position, so the entire enemy occupied area under attack was suppressed at the key moment, not just the first lines.   Meanwhile a “box barrage” could continue, aimed at the interior to continue to inhibit enemy attacks or formations. A box barrage is basically what it sounds like. A predefined area is designated to bombard and all rounds are aimed in that general area. Specific targets are not worried bout. The saturation of the area leaves it practically a no go zone to enemies, which then means that there is much less room for them to reorganize in that area. Which make box barrages quite useful for rear areas. It was well known that neutralization was much less costly and far more likely to work than actual destruction of the enemy. Box barrages work best when there is not good enough information regarding enemy positions for gunners to expect to effectively disable them. So the entire are is laid to waste with enough shells that no sane person would move through that area.   But where accuracy and surprise can be achieved, interdiction and counter battery fire become more likely to work. The idea would be to hit communications posts, transportation links, storage areas, large troop concentrations and so forth. These tend to be easy targets for artillery. Plus, they had the greatest impacts in terms of suppressing enemy activities. Counter battery fire aimed at destroying the enemy guns was used during the days prior to the assault. After that, the British figured they would have done the most damage they could do. After that they switched to suppressing fire against enemy artillery for the first 15 minutes of the attack, using smoke and gas shells. The goal here was to simply blind the enemy, rather than disable the guns.   The time limit for the hurricane barrage should be set at less than an hour. Any effect it has regarding infantry suppression would probably begin to wear off by that point. Ideally, the assaulting troops would arrive just after the barrage in an area stops – or at least without enough time for the enemy to recover from the shock, leave their shelter and resume active defense. Remember, 35 minutes worked well to overcome the first layers of defense. Suppressing, disrupting, demoralizing and stunning the enemy was all that was desired and expected. It must be noted that through a combination of 18 pounders, 4.5 and 6 inch howitzers could have the desired impacts in about 5 minutes. But this was impractical. It required extreme accuracy and intensity of fire. The infantry had to get dangerously close to where their own artillery was firing. Hence why longer barrages were preferred. But too long and costs go up with no real gains.

Uruks are not the most intelligent, but not known for being the total idiots that trolls are depicted as. So are the Wild Men. This means they are able to handle cannons if properly trained and the method is adhered to strictly. Careful reconnaissance to find targets and systematic ranging of targets would be done so that the crews would not have to make as many changes in battlefield conditions. This would mean Helm’s Deep would play into their strengths. Open battle would prove harder to deal with. But, the Fords of Isen would be such a battle. It could be easily scouted with the enemy forced to concentrate in predictable areas. In both cases, methodical reduction in enemy positions and preparations for infantry attacks can be achieved with artillery not exactly the fastest.   Prior to World War One, the German doctrine relied on similar methods. Artillery was to be used in massed formations with well-aimed and directed fire from concealed positions. Firing from maps was essential for this, which in turn called for solid scouting. This is something that Isengard could easily do given its use of wild men and Wormtongue. The Rohirrim could be baited into attacking the Fords of Isen where batteries could be already set up in protected and hidden positions. The river terrain would concentrate enemy fire on specific and predictable points, thus making firing on them much easier.

To again borrow from the doctrines around the time of Napoleonic wars, gun batteries had 6 artillery pieces and 120 crew.   Each gun would normally have enough rounds to fire at over one round per minute for over an hour - but in battlefield conditions this was rare. Low ammunition appears to rarely be an issue. The French allotted 349 rounds a piece for their 12 pounders. The single greatest expenditure of rounds was the British Sandham’s Company during Waterloo. It fired 183 rounds during the battle with 276 being assigned per gun. For Napoleon’s Army, 222 rounds were fired at Leipzig. Guns started the battle with 170 rounds, but had special supply trains set up to deliver an additional 340 rounds in the rear. Between 91,000 and 96,000 appear to be normal for his early campaigns. Destruction of Caissons were more likely to result in shortages, but this too was rare. What eventually caused issues was not rate of fire but the economics - Napoleons’ artillery was eventually silenced by the inability of factories to produce enough.   British rocket formations had 164 horses and 6 ammunition carts. If we assume that each cart could fit as many rockets as a wagon carrying 9 pound gun ammunition, then each would have 118 rockets.   To deploy the entire artillery in heavy batteries, Isengard would need 560 horses just for the guns. The light would only need 360 horses. I would suspect that Isengard would also use the 36 horses of Civil War batteries for the field forge and battery wagon. For the 7 to 9 batteries, this is an additional 252 to 324. Given that US gun batteries had 6 guns compared to the 10 to 12 of Russian batteries, the reserve would be 67 to 80. This means 560 to 603 horses for the reserve. Caissons required between 2 and 4 horses and each gun had between 2 to 5 caissons. For the full 90 gun deployment, this requires another 360 to 1,800 horses. As a result, Isengard would need at most 3,287 horses. This is not too bad. Granted, it would probably be between this number and 1,532. Wild men raids, legitimate purchases before he was revealed as evil and going all across Middle Earth makes these numbers very reasonable.   Field artillery in real life could be expected to cover ten to fifteen miles a day, though they could hit 40-50 a day if needed. Given the strength and endurance of uruk hai, I would expect that the larger numbers would be the norm for Isengard. Rivers 4 feet deep or less did not need rafts. The 9 pound British gun would take up 61 feet of road space and an additional 48 feet was taken up on march by each wagon.   In combat, the ammunition chest in use was put beside or in front of the gun. The caisson in use would be 20 paces behind the gun it was supplying. The rest of the gun’s ammunition supply would be kept to the rear of the army. When the wagon was running low, it would rotate to the rear and another would come up. This was done to balance the need to keep a constant supply of ammunition available to the gun while making sure enemy fire did not destroy the supply. Now, trail chest numbers I have range between 9 and 18 per chest. At the rarely achieved in battle ideal of 1-2 per minute rate, that would still leave enough time to get replacements to the front.   It must be noted that the battles of Isengard would not be the days long slug fests of the First World War. In the Austro-Pussian War, the German Army only used about 20,000 shells per month. Four years later this number jumped up to around 81,000 per month. The Russians used about 87,000 per month in the Russo-Japanese War. The Bulgarians used 254,000 per month in the First Balkans War. By 1914, the French used 900,000 per month. This jumped to 4,500,000 in 1916. The German Army in 1918 used a whopping 8,000,000 per month in 1918.