The Serbian Revolt

The crisis unfolding in Serbia has been brewing for several decades, largely at the fault of a singular man at the center of the plot. Aleksandar Karađorđević comes from a dynasty of high profile Serbian political figures, dating back to his great-grandfather’s participation in a revolt against the Ottomans. At age 13, he and his family fled to Russia after his father participated in a failed coup against the Obrenović regime, who are devout Imperial Loyalists. After attending university, Aleksandar focused on political aspirations, writing for an Ultra-Orthodox Nationalist publication, Prosvetitelj. His writings were considered inflammatory even in Russia, but he had a decent following with members of the Serbian intelligentsia.

Aleksandar’s family moved to Constantinople in 1933, likely at the invitation of state officials. An anonymous benefactor seemed to arrange for his residency, but no record indicates who this patron was. Having not only irritated the HRE but also the Russians, it is likely he accepted the offer so he could stay close to home, and better reach his audience in his homeland. The Balkan region at large had been subjected to several uprisings since his exile, as well as numerous assasination attempts on high profile Imperial figures. There was also a marked increase in religiously-fueled violence in Serbia, as the Orthodox and Catholic populations chafed against the growing Muslim minority. The tensions are evident even in Karađorđević’s writing, which became increasingly more disparaging of Islam.

In 1937, he formed “The Dardani Front”, an ultra-nationalist independence movement centered on the Autocephalous Orthodoxy. While he initially organized it across the border, he reentered the country in secret once the group had gathered enough manpower to protect him. By early 1938, his organized followers numbered in the thousands, with cells staging protests and rallies across the voivodeship. The stage was set for him to contest the power of the Acting Governor, Milan Branimir Obrenović.

The official stance of Governor Obrenović on the Dardani Front is one of concern, but he has ultimately been passive until recent developments. When asked about it by the press in August of 1938, his stated stance was that, “The Front’s efforts to divide the nation and blame their problems on their Muslim neighbors is a shameful break from the opinions of the average Imperial citizen,” and that their efforts would be better spent “Fighting our true enemies in France.” This sentiment was a straightforward deflection, and he clearly wished to prevent the conflict from boiling over until the war in the west subsided. As we all know, that wasn’t going to happen.

The war did not end as quickly as he hoped, and the Dardani Front was only growing to be more problematic. Counter-protesters often appeared at their events to defy their efforts to change the public’s minds, often breaking out into open brawls. From 1938-1939, over 87 riots broke out in Serbia, with almost 1000 deaths and countless personal injuries. After a Muslim man reportedly threw a brick at Aleksandar Karađorđević while he was speaking outside of a hammam, everything would change.

Starting in the summer of 1939, dedicated supporters of Karađorđević were almost always seen armed. It is uncertain how the weapons were smuggled into the country, but all of our analysts make the same claim; the weapons had likely been supplied by the Byzantines. No local entity would have had the wealth and reach to pull off a transfer like this. One of our agents has been able to collect a few of these ‘ghost rifles’, and they found a particularly suspicious element. All of the rifles were of Colombian make, suspiciously however none of them had their serial numbers on them. On closer inspection, it wasn’t that the numbers had been filed off, rather they were manufactured clean, untraceable. Whoever ordered the weapons on the Dardani Front’s behalf had the power to pressure the manufacturers. This narrowed it down to only a few potential culprits.

We are still developing a full report of the situation as it occurred in Niš on October 21st. That said there is a great deal of local and regional news coverage with which we can piece together a working narrative. We will utilize this information as part of this briefing, and supplement the information herein where we can. To start we have the account supported by Byzantine state media as claimed by the Strategos, Stavros Angelopoulos (referred to henceforth by his alias “Vlachos”)

The account explains that Karađorđević was on a tour in the main constituency of his movement, visiting major communities in Southern Serbia in an effort to rile up Orthodox support in mixed populations. Counter-protesters from the Islamic community there had also gathered in Niš , as well as Christians who were more loyal to the Imperial policy of religious acceptance. The protesters were particularly volatile, forcing Dardani Front volunteers to form an armed perimeter. At about 1307, some protesters attempted to yank a rifle from the hands of one of these supposed guards, distracting many of them. At that moment, a gunman from the opposite flank fired five shots at the speaker. As he was not a recognized member of the nobility, he could not wear a shield generator in public legally, a policy the Strategos claims was done to oppress dissenters. Some of these energy bolts struck Karađorđević in the chest and arm. While the shots were not immediately fatal, the gunfire took him down immediately, and he would be pronounced dead later that evening.

Once they realized what had happened, the armed guards opened fire. The response was severe, with many innocents caught in the crossfire. When asked about the retaliation in a press conference, Vlachos explained “These men, while well meaning, were acting under pressure. They saw the threat from both sides and correctly assumed it was an organized effort by bad-faith actors. Without knowing the enemy number, they operated on their gut instinct. I would expect nothing less from my own men.” The Byzantines later doubled down on this theory, which had been originally pushed by members of the Front in the immediate aftermath. The assailants must have coordinated the distraction as an organized militia of Islamic extremists. This indicated an effort to silence the Dardani Front, and that the Imperial government had ignored their warnings, possibly intentionally.

From what we gather, the initial backlash did not subside quickly; the Dardani Front’s gunmen spread out across the city, rallying sympathetic citizens to help them in what would follow. They sent a few of their men along with the less armed volunteers into the city’s Muslim neighborhoods, gathering them in a central location and placing them under citizen’s arrest. Any locals who resisted were considered conspirators, and incapacitated by any means. The more militant members of the Front were done listening to a government they felt had abandoned them, storming the city’s government offices and seizing police equipment. By the next day, the entire city was under the control of a new provisional government. The last call from the local garrison to Belgrade was clear; this riot was now an open insurrection.

A small contingent of Serbian troops were deployed southward to suppress the growing revolt, but they were too late. Karađorđević’s death had been the breaking point for the local populace, and the movement quickly spread into the countryside. An anonymous spokesman announced their intentions on November 1st; the rebels intended to fulfill the wishes of their departed leader, and establish a “Republic of Greater Dardania” evoking both the name of their movement and a long forgotten past of the region. They would govern with a ruling council of senior Front members, who hid their identities to prevent further Islamic assassins from targeting them. By this time, their movement had spread westward all the way to Podujeve, and they had been very successful in repelling the loyalist forces from the north. Not only were the locals instrumental in holding key geography in the region, Obrenović had underestimated how far reaching the independence aspect of the Front’s messaging had been. Over 18% of his forces went MIA in their deployment, joining the cause along with their better equipment. Their fighting strength was now in the tens of thousands, and the territory they held was growing fast. Unfortunately for the HRE and Obrenović, they had also called for help.

After they had secured Niš, the Provisional Council had contacted the Byzantine government requesting immediate support and recognition for their movement. They had a common political philosophy between them, and their departed leader had been fond of the idea of the Byzantine state as a potential ally in the future. As a result, only a day after their formal declaration of secession, the Byzantine Strategos formally recognized the breakaway state, referring to them as “Brothers under god who had lost much in their pursuit of freedom.” He denounced the Imperial effort to recapture the region, and made it clear they would answer any attempt to hamper their sovereignty with force. He also made preparations for Syntagmatarchis Hoxha of Albania to take a contingent of irregular troops northeast, to aid in what he was referring to as a “Special Peacekeeping Operation” in the new Republic.

Albanian troops arrived in the western frontier of Dardania on November 8th, where they quickly went to work disarming local “resistance groups”, and scattering Islamic communities in the region. While numbers are likely downplayed in their reporting, tens of thousands of Muslims have likely been displaced, along with several hundreds killed. If allowed to have their way, the total removal of the Islamic denizens of the region would result in a refugee crisis numbering in the millions in time. Small border forces of the crumbling local government put up a fight against the advancing liberators, but they lacked the munitions to hold out for long. It would not be long before Byzantine forces and the Dardani militia joined at the center, uniting the new Republic under a new banner.

The Dardani Front’s accusation of Orthodox persecution was seemingly proven right on November 19th, when a sudden swell of Muslim troops in Imperial uniform were spotted at the outskirts of Pristina. It appears their overlord had sent them to wipe them out after all. For many in the movement and their territory, this was the proof they needed, even if the truth was more complicated. The next day, the three forces converged on the city, with an open conflict breaking out. The Empire had intended clearly to retake the Republic, and install a new anti-Orthodox government. They could not let this happen.

Fighting ultimately lasted a few days, but the tide was quickly turning against the Imperials, especially as reinforcements from the east and west threatened encirclement. They were forced to retreat to Mitrovica, and the new Byzantine-Dardani alliance rejoiced. They formalized their relationship over the next couple of days, with Hoxha meeting officials from the new state in the aftermath. The Strategos also immediately declared to the world the Holy Roman Empire had violated the fledgling state’s sovereignty, and announced their intention to enter the war against the Austrian tyrants.

This account has obvious aspects that are refuted by our own analyses, which will be covered in the final section of this brief. It is also important to keep in mind the perspective of the Imperials, as many key details of these events remain unclear. The following is the official report released to the public, only hours before the Byzantine Strategos declared war. Our agents have prepared a proper translation of much of the text for this briefing.

Over the past few weeks, Aleksandar Karađorđević’s group had been engaged in a number of illegal activities in the area, including extortion, smuggling, and no small amount of violence. The Dardani Front was also potentially involved in a number of other religiously-motivated crimes, though evidence at the time was considered insufficient. On the night of October 19th for example, a masked group had attacked a mosque and set it alight. The authorities had been notified, but no charges were drawn up, and the case was dismissed. Governor Obrenović harbored suspicions, but tensions were so high, and resources so strained, that he instead chose to practice restraint on deploying local troops. To hopefully curtail the growing tensions, he instead requested that a number of Grenzer divisions deployed to the Italian front be returned to the border at the soonest convenience to aid in restoring peace, though they ultimately arrived too late.

On October 21st, Karađorđević and his group were approached in the marketplace of Niš by a group of prominent Muslim leaders from the region. The confrontation in the marketplace boiled over into a physical altercation after one of his armed men grabbed an Imam, dragging him through the line of protest into their own group, where several of them proceeded to beat him viciously. The counter-protesters surged forward to try to recover their religious leader, causing one of the Dardani Front members to open fire. This lone gunman incited his comrades to unleash a full volley, killing a dozen protesters in seconds. The local crowd, being unarmed, fled from the violence. In the aftermath, it became clear that Karađorđević had been shot, likely by one of his own men in the confusion. Claiming that the unarmed civilians had actually been trained assassins, his men took to the streets of the city, riling up the already stressed and questionably loyal Orthodox citizenry.

What followed was several days of extreme violence against the city’s non-Christian population, ending with the city hall being seized after a protracted gunfight with the city’s garrison and police forces. Reports from the garrison indicate that the Dardani possessed heavy weaponry, including machine guns and grenades, and that no small number of them had acquired body armor. As the rioting spread, local garrisons from the northern reaches of the Voivodeship were called up. They were, however, unsuccessful at quelling the revolt due to the increasing number of well-equipped rebels. Reports even came in of armored vehicles being employed by the Front in a number of areas. Their movement quickly began to spread across the southern countryside, committing violence on members of the populace who did not support them. The Acting Governor’s forces were unable to get the situation under control after weeks of rebellion, so the matter was finally handed over to the Imperial military to handle the situation.

On November 19th, the Bosnian 4th Militärgrenze Division arrived by train on the outskirts of Pristina. (Note from the Chamber Translator: The Bosnian 4th is largely Muslim in composition, lending an explanation to Byzantine reports) The troops were welcomed as heroes by the beleaguered citizens of the region, who had been subjected to terror at the hands of the rebels. Claiming that the presence of Imperial Soldiers in an Imperial City constituted an act of war upon the people of the city. The Byzantine dictator had decided preemptively to intervene in the conflict and ordered his men across the border. The 4th Grenzers, a veteran division, fought valiantly against the tide of Byzantine insurgents, but were ultimately forced into a fighting retreat. Since they had been spreading their efforts between fighting and evacuating the civilian population, it ultimately proved too much.

The Byzantines have now announced their intent to officially declare war, even as their soldiers burn Pristina, and the Emperor is well-prepared for a full-scale counteroffensive.

It is clear in reading both statements that neither party is willing to take responsibility for the situation, which is to be expected. The Byzantines have already landed themselves in many international disputes over their continued conflict with the Turkish Republic, and instigating a rebellion and eventual war would only worsen their situation on the global stage. The Holy Roman Empire is already at war with half of Europe, and certainly did not plan to join another so soon. What is obvious is that the situation has been allowed to deteriorate thanks to the gentle hand of Governor Obrenović, who likely could have curbed the movement in its infancy. That approach likely would have appalled the nobles in the Empire’s heartland, who haven’t fully realized how dire the situation outside their gilded towers has gotten. Likewise, while the Byzantines claim to have no involvement in this situation, many of our analysts in the Black Chamber are doubtful.

We have been monitoring the situation for a few weeks, long before today’s declaration of war, and we have some theories as to the reality of the Karađorđević assassination. The misfire theory stated in the Imperial report, while deeply amusing to some of us in the office, is supremely unlikely. While the troops in his service were largely inexperienced, the movement’s leader being shot by one of his own men would require someone on one of his flanks to turn and fire inward; an absolute failing of logic. The Byzantine report of extremist assassins is likewise hard to prove with mere hearsay, and could only be verified by catching the assailant. In response to the lack of clarity on the matter, three of our officers have prepared some working theories on the situation, both for your sake in any upcoming delegation, and as a testimonial for our gathered intel.

Theory 1: The Self Defense Scenario As Niš is surrounded by mountainous, largely natural terrain, the local populace likely possesses a number of small arms for personal defense and hunting purposes. With increased tensions from the Dardani Front, some muslims may have opted to carry these weapons in case they were accosted. While the Imperials claim no counter-protesters were carrying weapons, this is impossible to verify. They do however claim the Dardani militia was getting violent with the crowd, and assaulted at least one imam. It is not impossible that a member of the Front attempted to harass an armed member of the populace, who fought back with what weapons were available to him.

This is further corroborated by the type of wounds found on Karađorđević, which conclusively came from a low yield energy weapon. The weapon was certainly not of a military or professional grade, regardless of claims by the Byzantines. An organized group of extremists challenging a revolutionary organization that had access to unmarked military hardware certainly would equip their assassin with something of higher caliber, perhaps even resorting to explosives. This theory ultimately would only support the Holy Roman Empire in the long run, and coming forward with what evidence we have gathered would only serve to maintain our seeming neutrality in the ongoing war with France.

Theory 2: The Byzantine False Flag Scenario Many of the analysts on staff have voiced confusion over the nature of the Dardani-Byzantine relationship, as well as the failures of security around Aleksandar Karađorđević. The victim had been rather firm about his dream of an independent Dardania, and was quick to claim he had no involvement with the Byzantines. We know this cannot be true because of the weapons his men used. The Byzantines likely used their relationship with Gran Colombia (a fellow Pact-aligned state) to have them manufacture unmarked weapons to create deniability in an inevitable investigation. However, even as they were able to get guns, they did not acquire body armor or shields for their speaker as he traveled in “enemy territory”. While it has been mentioned that it would have been illegal to acquire such technology, his men by the end were openly flaunting their unmarked guns, an equally seditious crime in the HRE. Given that we can all but confirm the guns were smuggled from Constantinople, the question we should be asking is; Were the Byzantines unable to supply defensive equipment? Or perhaps were they unwilling to?

This has led many in the Chamber to speculate that the Byzantines were playing Aleksandar Karađorđević, setting him up for a failure to initiate a conflict in which they could be seen as liberators, not conquerors. Moreover a handful of them further attested that it was likely the Byzantines who carried out the assassination, hoping to instigate the entire conflict. Their quick response to the situation and open communication with the revolutionary council after they seized the city shows that their points of contact did not simply end with Karađorđević, and they likely were already in the loop on who has replaced him since. They armed the Dardani Front, but failed to supply him with proper defenses. The weapon used, as mentioned in Theory 1, was certainly a civilian model, but that could have also been intentional to sell the idea that locals carried it out.

The only issue with this theory is the level of complexity such an operation requires. Preparations would have to have been made years in advance, and the number of links in the chain would have been immense. Any gap in communication or even a single misstep would have hampered the operation. Accepting this series of events implies a great deal of faith in the Byzantine covert apparatus; or an extreme amount of luck. Nonetheless, we lack key information from agents in Constantinople to decisively put this theory to bed, and we wanted you, Mr. President, to be aware of all possibilities.

Theory 3: The Opportunist Scenario At this time the most likely scenario is still the most direct of explanations; that the escalation of the conflict by agitated locals was an inevitability. Aleksandar Karađorđević was preaching his religiously charged ideology to adversarial crowds all throughout Serbia, sowing discord with every speech. They knew that continued campaigning was going to grow increasingly hostile, as seen by the increased security and open carrying of weapons. These gatherings often became violent, and the blasé attitude of Governor Obrenović made both parties involved feel unheard. Whether or not the Byzantines were supplying the Dardani Front does not change that an open confrontation was on the horizon, only the intensity of the encounter.

The assailant was likely a local muslim man with ample motive and means to lash out against the disruptive gang of would-be revolutionaries, who decided to take matters into his own hands. We can safely say that if a cabal of organized extremists were operating in Serbia at the time of the attack, our field operatives should be aware of it. This man likely operated alone, positioned from an elevated point with a view of the scene. His willingness to fire when the imam was being held on stage also tells us he probably does not even have a strong religious inclination, just a previously moderate denizen of the area fed up with the violence carried out against his neighborhood.

While we cannot confirm this theory, it is the accepted account by a majority of Black Chamber officers at this time, and is the assumption we will operate under in the meantime. At the current stage of the conflict we advise the President to remain even-keeled in this situation, as it is still developing. While we officially hope this scenario helps the French allies in their conflict, the continued instability in Europe threatens our ability to remain uninvolved. It is only a matter of time before we are called upon to act to stabilize the region, and world at large.