Battles on the Po

In the summer of 1939 the Italian theater, following decades of tense calm, exploded into violence. Following the failure of the French military to pierce the Imperial fortress networks east of the Rhine, Communard high command launched a series of offensives across the Po river valley into Imperial Lombardy and Venetia. While the Imperial fortifications on the Italian peninsula were substantial, French command estimated that as much as 50% of the pre-war Imperial garrison had been redirected to the Rhineland front. An offensive on this front would also provide a valuable outlet for Italian Communist forces, among whom opposition to conscription to the Rhineland front was high. Framing this assault as an effort to reunify fractured Italy under Communism was hoped to instigate a rise in patriotic fervor amongst the Italian civilians, which while objectionable to the Communist ideologues within high command, was considered a necessary evil.

The planned offensive was to begin by departing French Turin and heading east directly to the Imperial fortress city of Milan/Mailand in total secrecy. A French armored column under Colonel Jacques Sadoul was to quickly bash through the Imperial fortifications on the western bank of the Ticino, seize the crucial logistical hub in Novara, and hopefully secure a series of bridges over the Ticino and establish bridgeheads in Lombardy proper. The first phase of the assault proceeded almost exactly as planned. The French armored column was able to advance at great speed down paved roads all the way from Turin to Novara, and the city fell after only 10 hours of sustained resistance. This assault was considerably aided by the reduced garrison present within Novara and the sabotage of the garrison's shield generator by an Italian partisan cell.

Unfortunately for the Communist offensive, the objective of total secrecy was not achieved. A Geheimdienst agent implanted in Turin was able to secure a complete copy of the Communist offensive plans and transmit them to the Imperial garrison in Milan less than six hours before the commencement of the attack. Imperial Colonel Raffaele Cadorna was faced with a difficult position. There was not enough time to receive additional reinforcement from further east, leaving him with only two garrison divisions and the authority to raise and arm the local Lombardy militia. Colonel Cadorna made the difficult choice to evacuate all but a token force from Novara east of the Ticino. The force remaining in Novara consisted entirely of volunteers under orders to hold the city for as long as possible with no hope of reinforcement or rescue. This resistance provided the Lombardy garrison enough time to destroy every bridge over the Ticino and hastily deploy minefields on its eastern bank. As Colonel Sadoul’s column finally rolled through Novara and the Ticino came into view, French soldiers encountered destroyed bridges and hastily entrenched positions on the far side of the river instead of the uncontested crossing he had been counting on.

The failure of the surprise assault resulted in a drastic change in Communist tactics. Components of Sadoul’s armored column rushed south along the Ticino and then east along the Po looking for a bridge across the rivers and into Imperial territory. These armored units raced against Imperial sturmpioneer units attempting to detonate the bridges before their arrival, occasionally also taking artillery fire from Imperial cities on the far side of the river such as Pavia. While during the first few hours the armored column encountered many near misses, with several tanks even lost while the bridge they were attempting to cross was detonated while they were still on it. By the time they reached the Communist controlled city of Piacenza without encountering a functional bridge, the unit admitted defeat and returned to command in Novara.

The next few weeks passed in relative calm over most of the frontline. Imperial and Communist units advanced to their respective river banks and established positions, with light artillery fire a common occurrence. The marshy conditions on either side of the river presented a severe obstacle for both armies. Artillery units sinking into the loose, wet ground after firing multiple salvos became a regular occurrence, resulting in both sides concentrating artillery batteries within established cities. An enterprising French officer attempted to break the stalemate by tunneling under the river and seizing the far side of the Po near Dodana in order to construct a makeshift bridge for a waiting armored unit. This only resulted in all five drills running directly into an aquifer, drowning all aboard including the officer. This incident resulted in the French command banning the use of drills on the Italian front.

The failure of the Communist forces to cross the rivers and establish bridgeheads gave Imperial command the time needed to move reinforcements into the Italian peninsula and to fully mobilize local militia units. While the French and Italian forces remained superior to their Imperial counterparts, the strength of the Imperial defensive position prevented meaningful offensive progress. Traditional efforts stymied, Communist forces turned to more asymmetrical attacks. Communist forces began an extensive propaganda campaign, deploying material encouraging Imperial Italian citizens to shake off their oppressors and embrace their fellow Italians in the freedom of Communism. This resulted in a notable increase in Communist partisan activity throughout Lombardy and Veneto. Smuggling across the Po and Ticino became primary objectives for Communist forces attempting to establish and direct these cells to accomplish sabotage and surprise assaults which might create an opening for a bridgehead over the rivers.

Imperial counterintelligence took notice of these efforts and dramatically increased efforts inside Italy, greatly expanding Geheimdienst field offices in both Milan and Venice. From time to time, Communist cells will pull off some minor coup, such as when a cell was able to spike the Imperial counter-artillery battery in Mantua. However, constant Geheimdienst pressure has prevented these infiltrators from creating a sustained Communist beachhead over the river. Many smaller villages near the frontline have suffered as a result of this shadow war. Communist agitators and southern Italian infiltrators have been known to hold great influence in these rural villages through threats, intimidation, bribery, or the genuine ideological support of rural communities. Geheimdienst repercussions towards Communist sympathetic or assumed sympathetic villages have been notably severe, with hanging or detainment of suspected traitors and agitators common but highly censored in Imperial media.

In an effort to break the weeks long stalemate along the river valley, and forbidden to use drilling machines for further offensives following the Modena debacle, French command prepared a daring plan. On August 5, 1939, multiple partisan groups were to conduct a coordinated sabotage of critical defense infrastructure. These groups were provided the following goals in order of priority,

This plan required absolute secrecy to be effective, and many within French intelligence deemed the mission to be impossible following the intelligence disaster of the original attack on Milan. The operation was marked as the highest level of secrecy and its execution entrusted to the most brutal and effective Communist ideologues amongst the Italian partisan corps. Prior to its commencement, French intelligence conducted a notoriously brutal purge of all suspected Geheimdienst agents in and around Turin. During this purge it was said that the guillotine in the Piazza Castello was in constant use for three days, after which the city was sealed by order of French high command and the materials to be used in the assault were constructed within the city. Critics pointed out that of the hundreds of individuals executed in the purge, at most one or two could have been Geheimdienst agents, but no one could argue with the results. These drastic measures combined with the complete compartmentalization of the partisan groups assured the secrecy of the operation.

The following operation represented an unmitigated disaster for the Imperial Italian front. The shield generator and defensive batteries in Pavia were sabotaged in the small hours of the morning, alongside with the communications relays of Pavia, Codogno, Cremona, and Abbiategrasso. Communist partisan groups activated throughout the city, pinning down the city’s garrison in asymmetrical street fighting just as French river boats docked along the city's canals, disgorging hundreds of elite Zouaves. While Pavia’s defensive garrison was paralyzed with brutal street combat, French engineers quickly assembled a pontoon bridge across the Ticino, allowing fast moving light tank units access to the city. Once Imperial command in Milan understood the nature of the attack, relief columns were dispatched from Siziano and Villanterio, but were waylaid by French mines and ambushes prepared by waiting partisan groups along the roadways. Within 16 hours, meaningful Imperial resistance in Pavia had been destroyed, and massed French and Italian units were marching towards Milan at double pace.

In the wake of the Pavia disaster, Milan found itself an embattled city. Whereas previously the city only had to contend with long distance artillery bombardment and the paranoia of constant Communist infiltration attempts, the city now faced direct aggression. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the city was considered relatively safe from Communist aggression due to its position behind the modern fortresses of Novara and Pavia. Thus, the city itself had begun the war with only a non-fortified military base and a modern and state-of-the-art shield generator. The weeks-long stalemate on the riverbank had bought the city valuable time to prepare, but Milan was still much less fortified than many other Imperial cities which had been designated Festung for years or even decades. Instead of concrete bunkers and embedded artillery, Milan had to make do with simple trenches, sandbag walls, and field-artillery emplacements erected in the Piazza del Duomo.

What followed was a terrible meat grinder of a siege. The Communist forces had finally gotten their teeth into prey which had not broken them, and poured large numbers of military equipment and partisans into the city. The suburbs in Opera and Rozzano became bloodbaths as wave after wave of Italian and French soldiers and partisans overwhelmed the hastily erected Imperial fortifications. Pressure on the city and the presence of Communist forces on the Imperial side of the river forced the defenders back from the riverbank in many places, allowing the Communist forces to construct a series of pontoon bridges across the Ticino and the Po in many places, and even to repair the larger permanent bridge in occupied Pavia. While artillery fire from Milan and loitering Zeppelins required Communist forces to constantly move their pontoon bridges up and down the Ticino, they still allowed enough material to get through for adequate resupply of the offensive.

The lower intensity of fortifications in the city allowed the besiegers to use standard armored units to a much greater degree than possible when sieging most Imperial cities. As Communist forces advanced closer and closer to Milan proper, these armored units drew within range of the exterior of the field generated by the city's shield generator. As the offensive approached the Viale Tibaldi and the minimum extent of the city shield, Colonel Cadorna made the difficult decision to disable the generator to prevent Communist engineers from disabling it on the ground. In the following week, French artillery unleashed a devastating barrage on the city’s historic center, with no regard for its cultural significance. Italian objections to the brutality of the bombardment went ignored by French high command, which alienated several Lombard partisan groups causing them to abandon the Communist cause. In rare cases entire partisan groups defected to the Imperial cause, bringing with them valuable intelligence. Within two weeks, a squadron of Imperial Zeppelins had been reassigned to permanently loiter directly over Milan with their shield generators set to maximum, providing insulation from the withering artillery.

The siege of Milan lasted a further four months, with large numbers of French and increasingly reluctant Italian forces marching into what swiftly became the most notorious meat grinder of the Italian front. While Imperial command issued mandatory evacuation orders for the city and all of western Lombardy, this order was widely ignored and volunteer civil defense brigades continued to resist Communist advance into their homes. By September 28th, 1939, the concentration of Imperial Zeppelins over Lombardy grew so thick that the Communist logistical network began to strain. Resistance from formerly loyal partisan groups drastically reduced the amount of supply which could be covertly moved to the frontline, whereas the Imperial forces continued to be supplied by undamaged rail connections to the north and east of the city. At last, Communist command was forced to admit that the extreme drain on equipment and manpower necessary to continue the siege were untenable. Even if the siege was successful, at this point it would represent little more than a moral victory. Milan lay in ruins, with its once vast industrial capabilities either destroyed or relocated east. What could have represented an easy route into Imperial Italy had been closed off by months of Imperial fortifications along additional defensive lines in the Alps and along the east bank of the Adda.

Faced with the task of breaching the southern ranges of the Alps, as well as Carinthia and Styria before approaching distant Vienna, French command privately made the difficult decision to deprioritize the Italian front. Military assets were withdrawn from the siege of Milan and established fortified positions alongside the western bank of the Ticino, strengthening the defenses of occupied fortresses in Pavia and Novara. At the end of the offensive, French and Italian losses were estimated at a staggering 720,000 killed or captured, with Imperial and civilian losses between 480,000 and 530,000. While the Imperials emerged victorious, much had been lost. By October 1939, the population of Milan had been reduced by nearly half due to death and evacuation, and the city’s once mighty industrial capacity was all but destroyed. As the last of the Communist forces were observed withdrawing from Lombardy, Imperial publications began mass distribution of propaganda materials. The most prolific of these was an infamous lithograph depicting the steeple of the famed Milanese Duomo steeple, destroyed by Communist artillery fire, with the caption "rotto ma non sconfitto", broken but not defeated.