Violent Fumes
Horrors Smelt not Seen
The 4th of Agun 1544 started as just a normal day on the processing floor of Charhold's Lubricants and Greases, a smaller business run by a dwarven couple employing some twenty workers, fishermen and refiners, ten of each. The order of the day was simple enough. They had a small order to ship and were also refining and processing a larger volume of Garlfin Oil to prepare for a ten barrel order that would ship out in a week. The smaller order was two barrels of Garlfin oil, and two of Ghel-3 a thicker refined whale oil used as a fuel additive and ignition starter for boilers and coal engines across Suranth to deal with the cold of winter, when the chunks of coal themselves would be too frigid to ignite. This thicker oil, almost a liquid grease, would not freeze and was extremely combustible, which is why it was favored for this task.
As any other day, the beginning of the day started simple enough, the workers going about their business, four of them carefully going about filling the barrels for the order shipping out and sealing them from the larger containment tanks. The two Ghel barrels were done swiftly, however when they went to fill the first barrel of Garlfin Oil, that's when the trouble started. To understand this, one must first understand the layout of the facility in question. As any facility that handles Garlfin Oil, that toxic substance and its fumes need to be contained at all times. The storage tank for it was in a separate smaller building, and unlike other oils and lubricants you couldn't fill these with open lids and hoses, no absolutely not. Garlfin Oil and the barrels in which they are stored use a specialized pressure line, two copper fittings, and a pump, to pump the oil into a still sealed barrel. Its an entire process, and a big part of that process, since its using a pressurized system, is insuring that both ends are fully and properly threaded. Companies that handle Garlfin Oil have very stringent standards to how many times a connector line, that is the copper and rubber line with the clasp fittings on each end that allow the pump system to draw the oil out of the storage vat and into the barrels, can be used before they must be replaced.
The reason for this is to avoid ever having a blow-out from faulty or worn fittings. These standards are generally well and before the wear and tear becomes noticeable, like a line giggles or threads but has a bit of wiggle to it even when fully threaded and 'locked'. Most facilities operate under the rule of 'four fists' which is every hose has a tracking document with it that must be filled out each time an employee is going to use it. Once a hose has been used to pump twenty barrels, its garbage, it must be disposed of appropriately, and a new one acquired. On this fateful day, with the work day having started late due to it still being quite cold and needing to warm up the facility enough to insure the metal fittings of the storage reservoirs weren't iced over, the workers were in a bit of a hurry.
Unfortunately this is was, we conclude, the first point of failure. Feeling the stress because the coach that would be transporting these materials across Geata-Iarainn from the facility in the South Narrows district up to the Railside district to be shipped via locomotive meant they had a tight schedule. The delay to de-ice the fittings of the reservoirs meant they were now rushing. Combine this with management failure, for they did not divert workers from refinement tasks to aid in this, leaving the four workers charged with preparing this load rushing knowing they were on the clock given how long the drive would take, including the trip up the Cliff-Crawler to get to Sky-Side.
The second point of failure was a domino effect from this first point. When the time came to fill the Garlfin barrels, instead of checking the documents pinned to the hoses in the shop, insuring they did not grab one that needed to be replaced or would need to be, a young man by the name of Tomas Bracken, a relatively new employee, though he had been taught how to do this, feeling the crunch, just grabbed the first hose from the shelf he could reach without checking its documentation. As fate would have it, that hose had seen twenty barrels and was put there by mistake the previous day, by someone who likely had meant to deal with it that morning, but never got the chance due to the mad scramble the day started with.
Furthermore he did not inspect the hose and its fittings, if he had of done so, he likely would have noted the threads had small gaps forming, wear and tear, the softer copper failing as it was want to do, hence the rule of 'four fists'. But alas, young Tomas was in too much of a rush, feeling the pressure from the driver and his boss, and the general situation. None of his more experienced teammates stepped in either, that is our next line of failure. For reportedly he was asked if he'd checked the paperwork, and his response was "It was on the shelf, and we only doing two barrels, its fine, lets go we on the clock!" At that point, one of the more experienced worker's should have stepped in and over-ruled the over-eager young man and taken control of the situation. Instead all three of them went along with it and they hooked onto the reservoir and the first barrel and began pumping.
The first barrel filled without a hitch, the pump running smoothly, nothing leaking, everything seeming fine. However unknown to these workers as they killed the pump's engine to switch barrels, closing the seal valve on the line to contain the fumes and liquid, a point of failure had already been reached. The garlfin oil was seeping into the small gaps as it was sitting, between the worn threads. Garlfin oil is a lubricant, its meant to allow things to move, which means that threaded seal was now slippery, greased, meaning it was not secure. Combine this with the shaking from the pump itself when it initially would be fired up, and the weakness of the copper fitting, you arrive at the moment of failure.
As they hooked back on the second barrel, there was a final chance to salvage the situation, but they once again ignored protocol. Before turning back on the pump, they were supposed to double check the connection to the reservoir. This is standard procedure between every barrel, in theory. In practice of course when doing multiple barrels this is all to often ignored as it was on that day. If they had of checked it, though no liquid had yet escaped, a light twist in either direction would have told them something was not right, as when fitted properly they should not be able to twist it by hand, needing a wrench to initially unthread it. Due to the garlfin oil in amongst the threading it would have moved and shifted easily, lubricated by the substance. Yet they did not check and fired up the pump.
As they did so, that initial burst of pressure, as oil attempted to flood the hose line, making the whole line shake and swell, that initial pressure was enough to deform the outer copper coupling of the threaded joint between the hoseline and the reservoir tank. A blowout occured, immediately spraying the volatile and highly toxic fumed oil all over two of the workers and the facility. Within moments, even as they were violently retching and vomiting blood, with such force it was breaking ribs, they managed to hit the kill switch on the pump. But the damage was done. More than a litre of the stuff had sprayed out at pressure and more was still flowing from the hoseline and tank, the valve on the tank still open. The smell was so vile and strong the fumes so toxic in that enclosed space that fume hoods did not help. Two of the workers passed out, one of them, Tomas Bracken, drowned, choked to death by his own vomit and blood. Another went blind.
By the end three of the four in the immediate room would die. Another six workers in the facility had grevious injuries, three will have respiratory problems forever. Neighbouring structures had to be evacuated, the fumes seeing violent episodes of vomiting, nose burns and general panic and discomfort. Broken ribs from how viciously one would retch were the most common immediate injury, with at least five people in the factory or surrounding facilities experiencing flayed chests, a condition where every rib was broken, though surprisingly all but one of them survived. In total twelve people died in this incident, as another, an older dwarf in a metal shop two properties down, had a weak heart and the panic his body produced as the vomiting started from the fumes caused him to have a heart attack. Another two dozen individuals were greviously or seriously injured with easily double that experiencing mild to moderate injuries. The whole block was evacuated and the specialized cleanup took three days and even still a notable hint of skunk and rotten fish simply hung around the area for weeks, unable to be overcome by anything but time.
This accident resulted in a change in legislation once the investigations established what happened, and now plants that handle Garlfin Oil distribution have two extra employees on all shifts whose sole job is to control the hoses. You do not track them yourself as a worker anymore you check one out, having to tell these individuals for how many barrels you need it for and they have all the documents for the various hoses, each with a unique part code to reference them with stamped on them. They are under lock and key and can only be accessed by these two individuals and they do not just hand it off to you. They travel with the hose, until you are done with it and have properly cleaned it out, and then they take it back, documenting its use. Some larger facilities have as many as four such 'hose-men' but the minimum legally required is two.
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